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THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 



BETWEEN 



Cromwell and Charles X. Gttstavus of Sweden. 



GUERNSEY JONES. 



370019 






THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 



BETWEEN 



CROMWELL 



AND 



CHARLES X. GUSTAVUS OF SWEDEN 



INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF 

PHILOSOPHY, SUBMITTED TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL 

FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG. 



BY 
GUERNSEY JONES, 

INSTRUCTOR IN EUROPEAN HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA. 



LINCOLN, XEB.: 

STATE JOURNAL COMPANY, PRINTERS. 

1897. 



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PREFACE. 



Civil wars are not favorable to the preservation of letters and papers 
of historical value, since no one is willing to preserve material which 
may, on the failure of his cause, compromise him in the eyes of his 
victorious enemies. No one is willing to preserve evidence which 
may subsequently convict him of treason. " Burn this letter after the 
perusal of it," wrote Col. Gilbert Talbot to the Marquis of Ormond in 
1655, "'tis not good to have papers, fearing some misfortune." In 
the case of the English Puritan Revolution, we know that some of its 
prominent men destroyed their papers, for they have told us so. We 
infer from the general scantiness of these records that many others did 
the same. 

There is another reason why our records for the Interregnum are 
so meagre. Charles I. had the commendable practice on the death of 
a secretary of state of seizing all his papers, which are now kept in 
the Public Record Office. But Cromwell paid no attention to such 
matters. Possession of a public document during his time was synony- 
mous with ownership ; consequently much the greater part of them 
are not to be found in the public archives, but in private collections. 
These have, to be sure, in large measure, come into the possession of 
the Bodleian Library and of the British Museum, and are therefore 
accessible, but the period of migration which they went through before 
rinding their final depository was not favorable to their preservation, 
and they still remain not only fragmentary but scattered to an exas- 
perating degree. 1 

The great mine of information for the diplomatic history of the In- 
terregnum is the collection of dispatches known as the Thurloe Papers, 
which, after a career of adventure, finally came into the possession of 
the Bodleian Library. The greater part of them were published in 
1742 by Thomas Birch in seven folio volumes. There is nothing 

1 The Reports of the Historical Manuscripts Commission give information concerning such 
collections as are still in private possession. 

(3) 



4 PREFACE. 

material among the unpublished dispatches. Reference to the collec- 
tion has been facilitated somewhat by Setterwall's "Forteckning ofver 
Acta Svecia in 'A Collection of the State Papers of John Tlmrloe,' " 
Historisk Tidskrift (Stockholm), 1890. The dispatches which relate 
to Meadowe's and Jephson's embassies should be supplemented by the 
letters recently found in New Zealand by Professor Edward Jenks 
and published in the English Historical Review, vii., 720-742. 

The Carte MSS. at the Bodleian contain some important letters. 

1 examined the Clarendon State Papers with care, but hardly felt 
repaid for my labor. Some of the Carte Papers have been published 
under the title "A Collection of Original Letters and Papers Concern- 
ing the Affairs of England, 1641-1660, by T. C. [Thomas Carte], 2 
vols., Loudon, 1739." Three large folio volumes of the Clarendon 
Papers were published at Oxford in 1767. The Tanner collection 
contains some negotiations between England and the countries about 
the Baltic, but they refer chiefly to the period of the Commonwealth. 
The greater part of the existing diplomatic documents of the Interreg- 
num are contained in these collections in the Bodleian. 

The college libraries at Oxford have nothing of consecpuence touch- 
ing our subject. 1 There is, however, among the Williamson MSS. 
belonging to Queen's College a manuscript catalogue 2 which contains 
brief notes of negotiations between England and foreign states from 
about the year 1540 to 1662, witli references to other volumes where 
they are more fully detailed. One of these volumes, designated by the 
mark §§§, presumably a manuscript volume belonging to Williamson's 
own library, has much material bearing upon English relations witli 
Sweden and Denmark during Cromwell's time, and referring especially 
to matters of trade. It would seem to be valuable, but I have not 
been able to find any further trace of it. 

There is nothing at the Public Record Office 3 worthy of mention 
except Bliss' Transcripts from the Swedish Archives, containing a copy 
of Bonde's Diary, and Baschet's Transcripts of Bordeaux's correspond- 
ence with Mazarin and Brienne. The latter, however, is much lessin- 

1 Coxe, Catalogus Codicum MSS. qui in Collegiis Aulisque Oxonieusibus hodie adservantur, 

2 vols. 

2 Queen's College MSS., xxxix. Williamson was secretary of state from 1G74 to 1078. 

3 R. S. Scargill-Bird, Guide to the Principal Classes of Documents preserve 1 in the Public 
Record Office. Detailed information is given in the various Reports of the Deputy Keeper of 
Public Records. 



PREFACE. 



structive than one might be led to expect from the similarity of English 
and French policies toward Sweden. There were various causes for 
mutual suspicion, and the relations of the two countries were by no 
means so cordial as the)' appeared outwardly. The domestic papers 
for this period have been calendared by Mrs. Green, and this Calendar 
has in turn been calendared, so far as Sweden is concerned, by Setter- 
wall in Historisk Tidskrift, 1889. Macray's Report on the Libraries 
of Sweden and the Archives and Libraries of Denmark in the Reports 
of the Deputy Keeper of Public Records (Reports xliii., xlv., xlvi., and 
xlvii.) are valuable for reference. 

The dispatches of the Swedish ambassadors in England have not 
been available to me. Those of Nieupoort, the Dutch ambassador, are 
contained in De Witt's Brieven, vol. iii. The relations between Eng- 
land, Sweden, and the Netherlands were so inextricably interwoven 
that the letters of Nieupoort are often as valuable as the dispatches of 
the Swedish ambassadors themselves. They appear to have been but 
little used in this connection. The correspondence of Schlezer, the 
ambassador from Brandenburg, published by Erdmannsdorffer in vol- 
ume vii. of Urkunden und Actenstucke, should not be neglected. 

Thurloe has given us two accounts of the Protector's policy in the 
North. One was furnished the House of Commons, February 18, 
1659, in a speech reported by Burton. The other, an account of the 
Protector's foreign relations as a whole, was furnished the ministry of 
the Restoration in 1660, of which a manuscript copy is among the 
Stowe MSS. in the British Museum. The second account has been 
used by the author of the anonymous tract "Concerning the Forraigne 
Affaires in the Protector's Time," printed in volume vi. of Lord Somer's 
Tracts, but without mentioning his source. The changes in the printed 
tract are in fact mere changes in arrangement and style. A copy of 
the latter part of the manuscript, which deals with affairs in the North, 
was made by Professor Grimur Thorkelin, the celebrated editor of the 
first edition of Beowulf, for the Royal Library of Copenhagen. 1 
.These accounts by Thurloe may be supplemented by a similar one 



ilt is contained in the new (not old. as Macray's Report gives it) collection of MSS., 649c, in 
folio. It was through information kindly furnished by the Rev. Mr. Macray and Justitsr. Dr. 
Chr. Bruun, Librarian of the Royal Library at Copenhagen, that I was able to trace the Stowe 
manuscript. It is, however, not the original, but an undated copy, with many errors in copy- 
ing. The part which deals with affairs in the North is printed as Appendix (A) to this work. 



6 PREFACE. 

by Meadowe, who from his experience as ambassador in the North is 
entitled to speak with some authority. It is entitled "A Narrative of 
the Principal Actions occurring in the Wars between Sueden and 
Denmark, before and after the Hoschild Treaty, * * * together 
with a View of the Suedish and other Affairs, as they stood in Ger- 
many in the year 1675, with relation to England." The first part 
was in manuscript for some years before it was printed in 1677. A 
copy of the manuscript having, as I infer, come into the hands of Sir 
Roger Manlcy, he did not hestitate to incorporate it into his " History 
of the late Warres in Denmark," published in 1670. The two ac- 
counts run parallel for pages with only verbal changes. Manley was 
a soldier in these wars and could not very well have had so intimate a 
knowledge of diplomatic events. In Wieselgren's Dela Gardiska 
Archivet, xii., p. 145, we are informed of another work by Meadowe, 
" The Interest of the English in the Sound as Affaires now stand, Lon- 
don, 1660," but I have not been able to find a copy of it. 

Among historical works which deal with this subject, Pufendorff's 
De rebus a Carolo Gustavo Suedce Rege gestis is the only one which 
covers the whole ground. Apparently it is based almost entirely 
upon the dispatches of the Swedish ambassadors, and is invaluable to 
those to whom the original correspondence is not available. It has 
been entirely superseded, however, for part of the period by Kalling's 
"Riksradet Frih. C. Bondes ambassad till England, 1655, akad. afh., 
Upsala, 1851." In this account the author has not attempted to 
make a critical estimate of the value of his sources, but has merely 
reduced Bonde's dispatches to narrative form. Indeed, he tells us that 
in all important passages he has used Bonde's own words. His narra- 
tive is nevertheless of great value. It is more detailed than Pufen- 
dorff's and pays more attention to exact chronology than Pufendorff 
seems to have thought necessary. It ends abruptly with November 
25, 1655. The promised second part seems never to have appeared. 

In recent historical literature there is little to mention. 1 The state 
of English records is not such as to tempt investigators to the subject. 
Gardiner's History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate has not 
yet reached this point. The Danish work of Fridericia, Danmarks 

i "Eine eingehende actenmassige Darstellung derselbcn (d. h., der englisch-schwedischen 
Beziehungen zur Zeit Cromwells) stcht noch aus." Pribram in Archiv fur Osterreichische 
Oesehichte, lxx., 100, Anm. 



PREFACE. ( 

ydre politiske historie, has not been continued beyond 1645. The 
Swedish published sources have a provoking way of stopping just 
before our period begins. Rydberg's Sveriges Traktater med fram- 
mande magter, has only reached (in 1891) the year 1630. Carlson's 
Sveriges historia under Konungarne af Pfalziska Huset (German trans- 
lation by Petersen) gives a detailed account of Swedish affairs during 
this period. Erdmannsdorffer's Deutsche Geschichte, vol. i., p. 211, 
seq., gives a more summary account, and devotes some pages to Crom- 
well's plan of getting a foothold in Northern Germany (vol. i., 284, 
seq.) Other sources will be indicated as occasion offers. 

It will be noticed how few references are made to the records of 
Parliament, to newspapers, or to contemporary pamphlets. Foreign 
affairs were controlled entirely by the Protector and his Council, and 
they kept their secrets so well 1 that little is to be learned from other 
than official sources. Even if information did occasionally leak out, 
the gazettes would of course not have been allowed to publish it. A 
convenient collection of newspaper cuttings has been published by Stace 
under the title " Cromwelliana." 

I have taken the liberty of modernizing the spelling in all the ex- 
tracts quoted. The spelling of the 1 7th century was notably careless, 
and I see no advantage to be derived from retaining it. 

I cannot neglect this opportunity to acknowledge the kindness and 
never-failing patience of Dr. Neubauer of the Bodleian Library, who 
rendered me the greatest assistance in every difficulty which arose in 
connection with the manuscripts in Oxford. 

GUERNSEY JONES. 

British Museum, April 15, 1896. 
HTrk. u. Actenst., vii., 742, Anm. 



INTEODUCTION. 



RELATIONS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND SWEDEN BEFORE THE BEGIN- 
NING OF THE NORTHERN WAR. 1 

The diplomatic relations between England and Sweden before the 
English Puritan Revolution were not so close nor so fruitful as the 
circumstances of the time would seem to have rendered inevitable. 
It was a period of religious wars, yet no alliance was formed between 
these two pillars of the Protestant faith. 

The fault of this must be laid at the door of the first two Stuarts, 
but it was not, as has been often said, the fault of their secret Catho- 
lic sympathies, but of their blundering personal incompetence. Their 
foreign policies were based upon dreams of religious toleration and 
mediation, upon consideration of supposed personal honor, upon the 
interests of blood relations, upon the influence of incompetent favor- 
ites, upon everything, it would seem, except the real points at issue. 

James' attempt to secure a position in Europe by means of which 
he could mediate between the hostile creeds and soften their intolerance 
was indeed a noble one, but it required a higher order of ability for 
its execution than he could tolerate in his councils. The humiliating 
outcome of the Spanish marriage project in 1623 marked the final 
failure of this policy. Just at this time, as if by happy chance, 
Gustavus Adolphus ascended the throne of Swedeu, prepared to take 
advantage of the change in English councils. He proposed a plan for 
a great Protestant alliance, which bears many analogies to Cromwell's 
project of thirty years later, but which was too thorough-going for the 
timid Stuart court, James was in no position to meet its financial 
requirements, and the more moderate proposals of Christian IV. were 
accepted instead. Gustavus Adolphus was compelled to resign his 
mission for a time to weaker and less worthy hands. 

'De diplomatiska forbindelserna mellan Sverige och England 1624-Maj 1630. Akad. afh. 
af Aron Rydfors, Upsala. 1890. De diplomatiska forbindolserna mellan Sverige och England 
1633-54. Akad. afh. af August Heiiner. Lund, 1892. Gardiner's English History, 1603-1642. lb., 
1642^9. History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, vol. i., 1649-52 

(9) 



10 INTRODUCTION. 

Restitution of the Palatinate. — In so far as Charles I. could be said 
to have had a definite foreign policy at all, it had but one object, the 
restitution of the Palatinate to his relations. In this of itself Gus- 
tavus Adolphus had no interest, and there seemed but little chance of 
an agreement between them. Yet, as Charles blundered in every 
direction, he must sometimes blunder in the direction of Sweden. 
There were several times when his interference in behalf of the Ger- 
man Protestants seemed imminent. 

In 1629, Sir Thomas Roe, an ardent advocate of a vigorous Protest- 
ant policy, was allowed to mediate a peace between Poland and 
Sweden, in order that Gustavus Adolphus might have free hand to 
interfere in Germany, though Charles would not promise in advance 
any active support. It was thus due to English influence under Sir 
Thomas Roe that Gustavus Adolphus was able to make his descent 
upon Germany in the summer of 1630. 

The victories of Gustavus Adolphus roused the greatest enthusiasm 
among the English people, but not in the English Court. Yet even 
Charles, moved by the ill success of his negotiations with Spain, France, 
and Austria, 1 found himself, as if by accident, drifting with the current 
of national feeling. Sir Henrv Vane was sent to Germany in the lat- 
ter part of 1631 to treat for an alliance for "the restitution of both 
Palatinates and the liberty of Germany." Gustavus Adolphus, how- 
ever, inconsiderately demanded men and money as the price of his 
assistance. An English fleet must protect his communications with 
Sweden, and the military resources of the Palatinate, in case it were 
restored, must be placed at his disposal during the continuance of the 
war. Otherwise he had no interest in the project. The English 
Privy Council urged upon Charles the acceptance of these terms, but 
he found them too straightforward. They might bring him into 
collision with France or Spain. He therefore proposed instead a 
subsidy of £10,000 a month, for which the Swedish king must use 
every possible endeavor to restore the Palatinate. This proposal was 
rejected. Gustavus Adolphus knew very well how little Charles' 
promises to pay money could be relied upon. 

So deep was the emotion aroused in England by the Swedish 

1 The clearest account of this part of Charles' tortuous policy is given by Gardiner, English 
History, 1603-1642, vii., 169-219. 



INTRODUCTION. 1 1 

victories in Germany, that Charles saw in it a reproach against his own 
inactivity and thought it necessary to prohibit the gazettes from pub- 
lishing news of them. Nothing could show mure strikingly his failure 
to identify himself with the spirit of his people. It was the fatal 
difference between Tudor and Stuart absolutism. Charles received the 
news of the death of Gustavus Adolphus, which seemed to the English 
people a national disaster, with the greatest equanimity. It would be 
easy now, he thought, for Frederick V* to place himself at the head 
of the German Protestants and to win back his own. He sent him 
£16,000 for this purpose, but Frederick died before he heard what 
was expected of him. 

Another opportunity for making English influence felt in Germany 
offered itself in the formation of the League of Heilbronn. The 
League in its weakness had been obliged to accept French support, and 
consequently to submit to French control, but it was anxious to bal- 
ance the influence of France by that of England. It promised to 
do all that could be reasonably expected toward restoring the Palati- 
nate. Yet Charles could not resign hope of gaining his object with 
less trouble through negotiation with Spain, and against the advice of 
his Council, he allowed this opportunity to slip. John Oxenstierna, 
son of the great Swedish chancellor, came to England to ask for as- 
sistance, but though he was received with every show of respect, he 
accomplished nothing. Somewhat later, Charles sent one ambassador 
after another to Sweden, but his foreign policy had long lost all coher- 
ence. 1 Even his own councilors were in the dark as to his true aims. 
As an inevitable result, he ceased to be courted. After the battle of 
Nordlingen, which he regarded with the greatest equanimity, he sent 
the usual hollow promises to Oxenstierna, but " the Swedish chan- 
cellor rode off to negotiate with the French ambassador without 
vouchsafing a word in answer." Charles' duplicity had isolated Eng- 
land and driven the Swedes and the German Protestants into the arms 
of France. 2 

During the Long Parliament and the Republic. — The relations be- 

1 " The schemes of Charles were so complicated and unreal, that they only serve to make 
the brain dizzy." Gardiner, Eng. Hist, 1G05-1642, vii., 352. 

- " No word of condemnation is too strong for the manner in which Charles treated the whole 
subject of his relations with the Continent. It had all the weakness of a purely selfish policy, 
without any of the apparent and momentary strength which a selfish policy receives from 
vigour of conception and boldness of action." lb., 391. 



1 2 INTRODUCTION. 

tween Charles and Sweden were thus far from cordial at the be- 
ginning of the English Civil War. In fact, Swedish sympathies were 
so strongly with the rebellious Scotch that in 1640 ships and ammuni- 
tion were promised them in case of necessity, though under the disguise 
of purchase. Oxenstierna was no friend to rebels, yet " he enumer- 
ated the breaches of the laws of the land which Charles had been 
guilty of, both in political and religious -matters," ' and thought that 
under certain conditions rebellion was justifiable. 

Nor was the cordiality which existed between Charles and his uncle, 
the kino- of Denmark, calculated to conciliate the Swedes. It was 
difficult to be a friend to Denmark and not an enemy to Sweden. 
When the war broke out between these two powers in 1643, an am- 
bassador was sent by Sweden to the English Parliament asking for the 
cooperation of an English fleet in protecting commerce in the Baltic 
Sea — i. e:, in operating against Denmark. The immediate cause for 
seeking this alliance with the English Parliament, however, disap- 
peared after the Treaty of Bromsebro, and in deference to the feelings 
of the French, the negotiations were broken off, although the English 
Parliament was, in consequence of rumors of a Danish-French agree- 
ment to come to the aid of Charles, more anxious than ever to pro- 
ceed with them. 

The execution of Charles I. brought with it naturally enough a cer- 
tain revolution of feeling in favor of his successor. Spiriug Silver- 
crona, the Swedish resident at the Hague, received orders to visit 
Charles II., and to show him the same respect as though he were in 
full possession of his royal authority. Yet when Montrose in his tour 
of the northern courts reached Gothenburg, expecting great things, he 
was sadly disappointed. Christina sold him a small ship, but had no 
further help to offer. Great as had been the outcry throughout Eu- 
rope at the execution of Charles I., the cause of his successor was not 
regarded as it would have been one hundred and fifty years later, as 
the cause of kings. 2 No European court would hesitate to desert him 
if it served its interests to do so. The reasons why Sweden was again 
driven to seek the friendship of the English Parliament must be 
sought, as before, in its relations with Denmark. 3 

1 Heimer, p. 43, seq. 

2 Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, xi., § 250. 

3 Perhaps Christina had already conceived that great admiration for Cromwell which she 



INTRODUCTION. 1 3 

The treaties of Bromsebro and Westphalia had so strengthened the 
influence of Sweden in the Baltic that the United Provinces could not 
but be apprehensive of the future of their commerce, and they were 
endeavoring to maintain the balance of power in that region by sup- 
porting Denmark against its too powerful rival. In February, 1649, 
a defensive alliance was formed between them, although the Swedish 
envoys at the Hague, Appelboom and Spiring Silvercrona, made every 
effort to prevent it. Spiring had not only been instructed to cultivate 
the friendship of the English ambassadors at the Hague, but in certain 
events to recognize the Commonwealth, and to inform them that an 
English embassy would be well received in Sweden. He now pro- 
posed to the queen that he be sent to London to prevent the success 
of the negotiations for an English-Dutch alliance which were being 
carried on there. The proposal was received with favor. His letter 
of credence was dated at Stockholm, September 2(5, 1651. 1 His in- 
structions related merely to the protection of commerce between the 
two nations and to the sending of an English ambassador to Sweden 
to carry on further negotiations. He died, however, before he had re- 
ceived audience, so the nature of the proposals which he was author- 
ized to make remained unknown to Parliament. A letter of condo- 
lence was sent to the queen on the event. 2 Both Denmark and the 
States General had thought it necessary to send embassies to England 
to counteract the efforts of Sweden. Even France took the opportu- 
nity to make advances to Parliament through the Swedish ambassador. 3 

A few months after Spiring's death, Appelboom was sent over from 
Holland for a short time to continue the negotiations. His instruc- 
tions contained proposals for transferring the English-Russian trade 

afterwards expressed so freely. "I may tell you this wild queen of Swede extols beyond 
measure the Pr. of Conde and Cromwell," wrote Sec. Nicholas, December 8, 1054 (Nicholas 
Papers, ii , 112), " and speaks very slightly both of our blessed Master that is with God and of 
the K., whose shoes she is not worthy to tie." See also lb., 112, and various passages in White- 
locke's Journal of the Swedish Embassy. Cromwell once sent his picture to her with a very 
elaborate compliment (usually printed among Milton's poetical works ; but Masson thinks it 
was written by Marwell. Milton's Poetical Works, ii., 343,869.), but after her apostasy he 
would hear nothing more of her. Whitelocke's Memorials of English Affairs, 599. 

1 A translation is contained in the Tanner Papers, lv., fol. 04. It was to the effect that " the 
friendship and nearness of commerce which from ancient times and even to this day uninter- 
rupted hath flourished between the Swedish and English nations may more and more for the 
future be rooted and moreover receive greater increase." It is indorsed, "Read, 27 January, 
1051 [2]." 

-A copy is among the Tanner Papers, li., fol. 219. He died February 9, 1052. 

3 Heimer, 77, seq. 



14 INTRODUCTION. 

from Archangel to Narva, Reval, and Nyea, which afterwards figured 
so prominently in Bonde's mission. He was also to try to mediate an 
agreement between England and France. 

Toward the latter part of the year Benjamin Bonnell was commis- 
sioned as Swedish resident in London. 1 On April 7, 1653, Israel 
Lagerfeldt arrived, ostensibly to mediate a peace between England and 
the Dutch on the ground of " the peace and welfare of the Protestant 
churches," but in reality for a very different purpose. The spirit 
and object of his mission is shown by the much debated proposal which 
he made on August 3, 1653, to the effect that the Swedes should "con- 
tribute all their endeavours" to supply the English with such materials 
of war at a reasonable price as they needed from the North (copper, 
iron, hemp, masts, etc.), in return for the privilege of fishing oif the 
coast of Great Britain ; but this was to be on condition that Swedish 
vessels should suffer no further molestation and capture by English 
ships of war. 2 The letter of Parliament to the queen on Lager- 
feldt's return is dated October 29, 1653. 3 Bonnell was continued as 
resident until 1655. 

Whitelocke's Embassy, 165 ' ^ — Appelboom had found the English, 
now that their relations with Holland were becoming strained, very 
eager to close an alliance with Sweden, and they were much disap- 
pointed that he did not remain to complete it. Hitherto all advances 
had been made by Sweden. They were now to come from Parlia- 
ment, On December 23, 1652, even before Lagerfeldt's arrival, it 
was determined to send an ambassador thither, and on December 31 
Viscount Lisle was selected. His instructions 5 were not ready till 
March 22, 1653. After the expulsion of the Rump, however, he 
asked to be excused on the plea of ill health, and it was deeided to 
send Richard Salwey and Mr. Strickland in his stead. But Salwey 

1 Tanner Papers, liii., fol. 141. Dated October 23, 1052. " Read 22d of February, 1652[3] ." 

- Lagerfeldt's mission is usually referred to as though its only significance lay in its religious 
character, of which, in fact, it had very little. There is a manuscript volume in the Public 
Record Office, "Council of State: Negociations with Sweden," S. P. Sweden, xi., containing 
copies of the various letters, papers, etc., exchanged in the course of the negotiations, in which 
little effort is made to conceal their real nature. 

3 Tanner Papers, liii., fol. 57. His letter of credence was dated January 20, 1653. 

1 Whitelocke's Journals of the Swedish Embassy, Reeve's edition. Ranke, Eng. Gesch., hi., 
459. Heimer, ch. iv. Fries, Erik Oxenstierna, 14'.», seq. Thurloe State Papers, vols. i. and ii. 
There are many papers relating to this embassy in the private collection of the Marquis of 
Bath. Hist. MSS. Commission, 3d Rept., App., p. l'.)2. "*+^z^^ 

5 Thurloe State Papers, i., 227. T^W^ 

c Earl of Westmoreland's Papers, Hist. MSS. Coinin., 10th Rept., App. 4, p. 410. Cromwell to 



INTRODUCTION. 1 5 

begged to be excused on the ground of "unfitness through want of 
freedom of spirit and bodily health." The Swedish embassy was 
never popular and it was difficult to persuade any one to undertake 
it. Finally, however, Whitelocke was frightened into accepting it. 1 
He left England on the 6th of November and arrived at Upsala on 
the 20th of December, 1653. 

Whitelocke's instructions 2 were identical with those of Lisle except 
in one point; but the difference is noteworthy. The war with the 
Dutch had in the meantime lost some of its bitterness, and some of the 
more severe paragraphs relating to them were omitted. Yet even with 
this mitigation, the significance of the embassy still lay in its hostility 
to Holland. Whatever expressions may have been used pointing to 
an underlying religious motive, 3 these only give evidence of the extent 
to which religious feeling prevaded public life in England at this time; 
but in the course of the negotiations these motives have no material 
significance. 4 AVhen Whitelocke in his first private audience with the 
queen dwelt upon religious matters, he was met with pleasant raillery. 
" Methinks you preach very well, and have now made a good sermon," 
she said. In his next interview, however, when he showed her a list 
of the Parliamentary fleet, her demeanor was very different. "This is a 
gallant navy indeed," she said; "I am exceedingly taken with the 
description of it. * * * Some of these ships of yours would do 
good service to open the Sound. What do you think fit to be taken 

R. Salwey, August 11, 1653. informing him that the Council desires to send him with Mr. Strick- 
land to " Swethesland, a thing too long neglected by us already, and may be of greater im- 
portance than any design we have of that kind anywhere else." Somewhat later, Cromwell 
spoke in a similar strain of the relations between England and Sweden. "And the business 
is of exceeding great importance to the Commonwealth, as any can be; that it is : and there 
is no prince or State in Christe .dom with whom there is any probability for us to have a friend- 
ship, but only the queen of Sweden." Whitelocke's Swedish Embassy, p. 14. 

1 " Rather to go the journey in great danger than to stay at home in greater." Whilelocke's 
Swedish Embassy, i., 35. 

- ibid , i , 85, seq. The public instructions were dated October 21, 16~>3, the private instruc- 
tions a week later 

■ ; Ib., L, 29, seq. Advantages of the Embassy to the Protestant Cause. 

4 Even with ( 'romweli this motive does not appear to be nearly so prominent as it afterwards 
became "If I And the queen willing to join with you," asked Whitelocke, " for the gaining of 
the Sound, and against the Dutch and Danes, and that heartily and hopefully, shall I put that 
business to the utmost and are you willing to enter into such a conjunction?" To which 
Cromwell replied, "If you find them inclinable to it, put it on as far as you can, and let us 
hear from you what you judge best to be done in it. No business can be of greater consequence 
to us and our trade, wherein the Dutch will endeavour to overreach us ; and it were good to 
prevent them and the Dane, and first to serve our own interest." Whitelocke's Swedish Em- 
bassy, i., 94. 



16 INTRODUCTION. 

to open and make free the passage thereof?" "It cannot be taken ont 
of their [the Danes'] hands but by force," she continued. "Do you 
think that the Commonwealth of England will give assistance in that 
business? " " Madam, I think they will," replied Whitelocke, " upon 
such just and honourable terms as may be agreed." " Do you think they 
will send any ships for that purpose ? " "I believe upon fit terms 
they will." " What would yon propose as fit to be done in that busi- 
ness?" 1 Here was the real point of contact between English and 
Swedish interests., 

The old Chancellor Oxenstierna, however, held back. He was too 
clear-sighted not to see what far-reaching changes in Sweden's policy 
such an alliance would have. He also questioned the stability of the 
existing: government in England, although his fears were somewhat 
allayed by Cromwell's assuming the title of Protector. Pimentelli, 
the Spanish ambassador, who had much influence at court, advised 
Whitelocke to negotiate directly with the queen. But although she 
took much interest in the project of an alliance between Sweden, Eng- 
land, and Spain which Pimentelli proposed to meet the existing alliance 
between Denmark, the Netherlands, and France, she was too much oc- 
cupied with her abdication to exert her authority in other matters. 
When Pimentelli found Whitelocke not inclined to admit Spain into 
the alliance, he too used his influence against it. 

Erik Oxenstierna, who conducted the negotiations during the ill- 
ness of his father, placed the greatest stress upon commercial matters, 
desiring permission for Swedish subjects to trade with America, and 
to fish on the coasts of Great Britain, and that English traders might 
be established at Narva, Reval, and Gothenburg; but Whitelocke pro- 
posed that these matters be left to future negotiations in England. 
The time was in fact unfavorable for deciding momentous questions 
of policy. The accession of a new sovereign and the close of the 
Dutch war might bring changes in the council of both Sweden and 
England. It was therefore thought best to leave the matter nnde- 
cided. The treaty which bears the date April 11, but which was 
not really concluded till April 28, provides in general terms for u a 
good, firm, sincere, and perpetual peace, amity, alliance, and correspond- 
ence," but leaves all means by which the alliance would be made 

i Whitelocke's Swedish Embassy, i., 25S, seq. 



INTRODUCTION. 1 7 

effective to further negotiations, for which purpose it was understood 
an ambassador would be sent to England. 

The treaty was but an expression, in general terms, of friendship and 
amity and was in fact a postponement of the whole matter. On May 
20, Whitelocke took his departure, two weeks before the accession 
of the new sovereign who was to continue, though under very dif- 
ferent circumstances, the policy of interference on the continent which 
had been inaugurated by his uncle, Gustavus Adolphus. 



DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CROM- 
WELL AND CHARLES GTJSTAVUS. 



Revival of Sioedish Aggression and Necessity of English Support. — 
Ever since Sweden had emerged under Gustavns Adolphus from its 
position of comparative isolation it had been driven to seek English 
aid in its undertakings on the continent. The two nations seemed not 
onlv by their community of religion and similarity of national char- 
acter, but by their mutual interest in opposing the commercial suprem- 
acy of the Dutch, as if destined by nature to be each other's allies. 1 
When Charles Gustavns on his accession to the Swedish crown set out 
in his "endeavour to follow the example of his famous predecessors, 
which was to enlarge as well as defend their dominions," 2 he was 
likely, in view of the resentment already aroused by Swedish aggres- 
sion, to need English aid more than ever; for, with all the brilliant 
successes which had crowned Swedish arms, its position with regard 
to its neighbors at this time was a desperate one. Each success had 
been at the expense of some other state, until its extended border was 
threatened by an unbroken circle of foes. Denmark was smarting 
under the disgrace of the treaty of Bromsebro, by which it had lost 
not only the provinces of Holland, Jamtland, Herjeadalen, and the 
islands Gottland and Oesel, but also its monopoly of the tolls in the 
Sound. Brandenburg had been alienated by the loss of Pommerania 
and the petty acts of violence in settling its boundary. Mecklenburg 
had lost Wismar and the customs duties in its remaining ports. The 
German Empire had been brought into a position of commercial de- 
pendence, and had been compelled to yield to the Swedish intruder a 
voice in its imperial government. Ferdinand III. had many old 

i Whitelocke's Memorials of English Affairs, 602. Also Lagerfeldt in the volume mentioned 
above. S. P. Sweden, xi. " For God and nature having so seated these two lands and nations, 
that neither a too great distance between both can deprive them of all communication, or ren- 
der it difficult, nor a too great vicinity make them obnoxious to the fatal animosities incident 
ordinarily to neighbors." This was a favorite argument at that time. 

2 "The most Heavenly and Christian Speech of the Magnanimous and Victorious King of 
Sweden Charles Gustavus Adolphus, on his Death-Bed, etc." Pamphlet, London, 1660. 

(19) 



20 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

scores to settle, both as emperor of Germany and as king of Hungary. 
Poland, like Denmark, was in a state of chronic hostility, for various 
reasons, among others from the loss of territory. Finally, the rising 
Russian power was already conscious of the necessity of piercing the 
slender slip of Swedish territory which threatened to transform the 
Baltic into an inland sea. Some or all of these powers were only 
waiting for a favorable opportunity to turn the scale of fortune. To 
all this came a crowning danger. The success which had attended 
Sweden's efforts to get possession of the Baltic ports for the purpose 
of controlling trade, had brought with it the uncompromising hostility 
of the Dutch. Any attempt to extend this oppressive rule would in- 
evitably be met by the despatch of an overwhelming Dutch fleet into 
the Baltic, the very heart of the Swedish dominions. 

It would seem as if Charles Gustavus' safest course under the cir- 
cumstances would have been to adopt a waiting policy with Walpole's 
motto, Quieta non movere. But internal difficulties prevented. Sweden 
was too poor to wait. Its army must be kept together at all hazards, 
which could only be done by throwing the expense of its maintenance 
upon Sweden's enemies, i. c, by declaring war. 

But against whom ? The extreme danger of setting the surround- 
ing hostile forces in motion was not lost sight of. Christopher Bonde 
called the attention of the Swedish Council to the special danger from 
the side of the Dutch, in which opinion he was seconded by Wrangel 
and Wittenberg. 1 He argued that if, as had been proposed, Poland 
were made the seat of the war which they were about to declare, and 
Sweden thus left exposed, it must not be expected that Denmark and 
Holland, to say nothing of the German princes, would remain idle 
spectators. Affairs in this quarter must first be made secure by a 
double attack on Denmark, from Sweden and from Bremen. After 
the Danes had been subdued and the slow-acting States General nut 
only divided and disconcerted, but fearful of renewed hostilities on the 
part of the English, 2 the war against Poland might be undertaken with- 

1 Bedenken des Schwedischen Senats, iiber die Frage : Wer von den benachbarten Potentaten, 
weil Krieg zu fiihren notig erachtet worden, zu attaquiren sei? Lunig, Staats-Concilia, ii., 557. 
This meeting of the Council was held December 11, 1654. See, also, Carlson, Schwedische 
Geschichte, iv., 39, seq. Following an ancient custom, two speakers were choien to conduct 
the debate on the question under consideration. Christopher Bonde was chosen to defend the 
policy of renewing the war. 

2 Pufendorff, Dc rebus a C'arolo Gustavo gestis, lib. i.. g •">: 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 21 

out unduly exposing Sweden. But to this argument answer was 
made, and sustained by the opinion of the Council, that any serious 
menace to Denmark's existence or welfare would be resented not only 
by the Germans and Dutch but by the English as well ; l an opinion 
which subsequent events proved to be well founded. 

The Swedish statesmen thus found themselves confronted with a 
dilemma, either horn of which threatened to involve them in a war 
with Holland, to whose maritime strength Sweden was particularly 
vulnerable. There seemed but one alternative open, to secure the sup- 
port of a maritime power strong enough to hold the Dutch in check ; 
and who should this be but the enemies of Holland, the English? It 
was possible, it is true, that this English aid might be dispensed with. 
If Sweden's enemies were numerous, they were also weak and divided, 
and no one could tell what effect a bold attack might have, or what 
circumstances might arise to prevent them from uniting. Yet, on the 
other hand, English support might prove to be the very keystone to 
the whole Swedish position. 

Appointment of Swedish Ambassadors. — That Charles Gustavus 
appreciated from the first the importance which his relations with Eng- 
land might have, there is abundant evidence to show. 2 It was some 
months before his plans began to take definite form, 3 and it was of 
course desirable to postpone the formal embassy to England until they 
had been fully matured. But, in the meantime, a disquieting rumor, 
trifling in itself, showed the desirability of having a representative at 
Westminster to counteract certain influences unfriendly to Sweden 
which appeared to be at work there. It was said that Cromwell had 
expressed his surprise that Danzig and the Hanse towns had not of- 
fered their mediation between Sweden and Poland, since their interests 
lay so clearly in the maintenance of peace. This report troubled 
Charles Gustavus exceedingly. It was true the Protector could hardly 
be expected, now that he was at peace with both Denmark and Hol- 
land, to be as anxious for an alliance with Sweden as he had been the 
year before ; but could it be that he was now inclined to join these 

1 "Und die Teutschen, Holl- und Engellander werden es niernals zugeben, dassDanemark von 
Schwerten unterdriickt, und die Nordischen Konigsreiche in eine, alien Nachbarn formidable 
Monarchie gebracht werden sollten." Lunig, Staats-Concilia, ii., 557. 

s For example, the favor shown to Whitelocke. Swedish Embassy, ii., 256 and 261. 

3 " Annu i slutet af 1654 svafande och obestamda, antogo dessa [konungens planer for den 
utrikes politiken] smaningorn en fastare gestalt." Carlson, i., 88 (German trans., i\\, 76). 



22 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

powers whose interests lay in maintaining peace in the North ? It was 
decided to send an informal embassy to England to inquire whether 
this report was true. Peter Julius Coyet 1 was chosen for the mission. 
His departure was delayed for some time by Cromwell's delay in the 
exchange of certain formalities, 2 until a sharp reminder through the 
Swedish resident in London set the matter right. His instructions 
were dated November 25, 1654. He sailed from Gothenburg early 
in December, but did not reach London till March, being some three 
months on the way. The object of his embassy was to obtain the ear 
of the Protector in order to present the king's plans in a favorable light 
and to meet any misrepresentations which the Dutch or others might 
make as to his intentions, and, in general, to prepare the way for the 
more formal embassy which was to follow. 3 

Covet was followed shortly by George Fleetwood, an Englishman 
in Swedish service, whose appointment proved to be exceedingly im- 
portant on account of his connection with Cromwell's family. 4 He 

1 Coyet was secretary and assessor in the Swedish commerce collegium, and in high favor with 
Charles Gustavns. He was only thirty-six years old, of handsome presence, we are told, and 
of considerable scientific and linguistic attainments. His name appears often in the records 
of the following negotiations, and the part he played, though not distinguishable from that 
of his colleagues, seems to have been important. Cromwell testified his regard by making him 
Knight of the Garter, and by a valuable present and a letter to Charles Gustavus commending 
him highly (Milton, Literse, 117). He played an important part in subsequent Swedish affairs, 
being one of the principal Swedish negotiators of the treaty of Roeskilde. 

2 As soon as the festivities attending his coronation ceremony were over, Charles Gustavus 
had sent a letter to Cromwell announcing his accession and expressing a desire to maintain 
the existing friendship with him (Thurloe, State Papers, ii., 37:)). Cromwell answered in a 
similar strain (Milton, Literse, 78), but though his reply is dated July 4 (or July 14 ; see Mason's 
Life of Milton, iv., 03(5), it was not sent for some time, as I suspect through motives of economy. 
He hoped some less expensive way would present itself for presenting his compliments than 
through a special envoy. ( See Coyet's instructions, §8. in which he is told to decline to carry 
the Protector's ratification of the treaty of Upsalaback for him, in case he should be asked to.) 
The delay caused some apprehension in Sweden. Not only was Coyet held back by it, but it 
might indicate an indifference on Cromwell's part. There appears to be some correspondence 
in the Swedish archives between Coyet and Oxenstierna concerning the matter. See Fries. 
Erik Oxenstierna, note 15, p. 352. 

3 Coyet's instructions have been printed by Treffenberg, "K. Carl X Gustafs instruction for 
Secreteraren Coyet under dess beskickning till England ar 1654. Ur Upsala Universitets Hand- 
skriftsamlingar. Akad. afh. Upsala, 1851." Pufendorff gives a more convenient summary of 
their contents in two passages, lib. i., §9, and lib. ii., §86, to the latter of which the reader is 
referred for details. Pufendorff, however, mentions some matters not included in the instruc- 
tions of November 25, for which I have not been able to trace his authority ; but they probably 
rest upon some subsequent instructions. See Fries, Erik Oxenstierna, 130. 

4 His brother, ( 'harles Fleetwood, was Cromwell's son-in-law, and held a leading position in 
the Protector's court. He was lord-deputy of Ireland, a member of the council of state, one 
of the major-generals, and the officer highest in rank in the armies of the three kingdoms. 
He was in complete accord with both Cromwell's foreign and domestic policy, and wa< so high 
in favor that it was said Cromwell intended him to be his successor. He was absent in Ireland 
when his brother was sent as envoy extraordinary to England, but he returned in September, 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 23 

was to proceed to England under the pretense of looking after his pri- 
vate interests, and was to sound Cromwell's attitude towards Sweden 
and the prospects for a closer alliance, together with the conditions 
which Cromwell might be expected to demand, and also to obtain per- 
mission to enlist six or eight thousand Scottish recruits for Swedish 
service. His instructions were dated May 15, but he did not reach 
London until July. 

But the principal embassy was entrusted to Christopher Bonde. 
That Charles Gustavus should dispatch three envoys to England 
within so short a time shows what importance he attached to his rela- 
tions with that country. If this needed further confirmation, it is fur- 
nished by the fact that the one first intended for this principal embassy 
was none other than Erik Oxenstierna, the Swedish chancellor, who 
directed the foreign affairs of Sweden from October, 1654, till his 
death. 1 The news that he might be expected was received with satis- 
faction in England as a special mark of honor, but the press of busi- 
ness required his presence at home, and Christopher Bonde, who stood 
next to him in the commerce collegium, was named in his stead. 2 In 
view of Bonde's warning against the Dutch, which we have already 
noticed, and his extensive knowledge of matters of trade, with which 
his negotiations were expected to be chiefly concerned, his appointment 
appeared to be a most appropriate one. 

Bonde's instructions were dated June 14, 1655. 3 So far as the 

1655. George Fleetwood entered Swedish service in 1629, when he conducted a troop of horse 
which he had raised in England to Gustavus Adolphus' aid. He rendered important services 
to Sweden, and received many honors in recognition of them. He was made successively 
Swedish knight, baron, lieutenant-general, and member of the council of war. This was his 
third mission to England. The other two missions, in 1630 and 1636, respectively, had also the 
object of raising troops for Swedish service, and both of them had been successful. The influ- 
ence which he was able to exert in England was so considerable that he was retained at the 
post until 1660. He must be carefully distinguished from George Fleetwood, the regicide, 
whose name appears so often in English records of this date, else one will be sorely puzzled at 
the double role which he seems to be playing. 

1 Fries, Erik Oxenstierna, 222. He died October 23, 1656. 

2 Bonde was one of the most trusted of Charles Gustavus' councilors, "a God-fearing, hon- 
orable, eloquent, and learned man," whom even his political enemies spoke of with respect. 
He had studied at Oxford in his youth, and probably had a fair knowledge of the English lan- 
guage and of English ways, which must have been of great value to him at the Protector's 
court, where Latin was not extensively cultivated. Though he was but thirty-three years of 
age, he had already filled important positions, and was a member of several Swedish councils. 
But he was most at home in matters of administration and trade, in which he appears to have 
had Charles Gustavus' absolute confidence, especially in his somewhat ambitious plan for 
breaking up the Dutch monopoly of trade in the Baltic. 

3 Riksregister. A copy is in the library of the University of Upsala. So far as I can discover, 
they have not been printed and I have been compelled to rely solely on Pufendorff, ii., § 88. 



24 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

points left by the treaty of Upsala to be determined by farther nego- 
tiations are concerned, they are essentially the same as those of Coyet. 
But as concerned the question of a closer alliance, it was otherwise. 
In place of mere suggestion or inquiries, he was authorized to make 
a definite proposal in the following terms : Cromwell should, in return 
for concessions in point of trade, place at the king's disposal and 
maintain at his own expense, as long as it might prove necessary, twenty 
ships of war, fully equipped and manned ; he should further guarantee 
the safety of the English Channel and the open sea for Swedish com- 
merce, should allow the king to recruit soldiers in England and to 
hire ships, and should grant to Swedish merchants certain advantages 
in England over other foreigners, the exact nature of which was not 
stated. 

The concessions which were to be offered in return for this support 
were, it must be said, indefinite and illusory. The king engaged not 
to interfere with English commerce in such ports and lands as he 
should conquer; the English staple in Danzig would not be interfered 
with, and might even be transferred to Riga; English ships would be 
allowed the same advantages in Swedish ports as Swedish ships desig- 
nated half-free, 1 provided the English would grant equal privileges to 
Swedish ships in other places, or some equivalent advantage. Bonde 
was also instructed to call the Protector's attention to the extraordinary 
value of the Baltic trade, and the possibility for still greater expansion, 
the undeveloped resources of the surrounding country and the rivers 
which flowed into it. The advantages of this trade had hitherto been 
reaped by the Dutch, but the king was now anxious to divide it 
with the Protector in return for the support which he asked. Thus 
behind the immediate grounds for seeking an English alliance is the 
shadow of this great project involving the destruction of the Dutch as 
a maritime and sea power. Dominium maris baltici in the hands of 
this ambitious prince would have become not merely the means of 
plundering the Dutch trade through exorbitant tolls, but the means of 
supplanting it altogether. 2 The manner in which he would divide 

1 Swedish free, half-free, and ordinary ships paid duties in the ratio of 3, 4, and 5 respectively. 

2 These plans were not entirely unknown in Holland. See, for example, the pamphlet enti- 
tled " Copye Translaet, van seecker Sweedsen Brief geschreven aen den Koniek van Sweeden, 
etc., door desselfs Rycks-Raedt, Heer Christer Bonde, etc., waer van de geintercipieerde Orig- 
eneele noch voor handen, ende onder anderen klaerlijck daer uy t te lesen is, Hoe ende Waerom 
de Sweeden tracten, de geheele Oosterse Negocie en commercie van Amsterdam nae andere 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 25 

the spoils with his English ally, however, was left for the future to 
decide. 

Sonde's Arrival in England; Influence of the Dutch. — As his royal 
master was on the point of embarking for Poland, Bonde sailed for 
England on the 16th of June, 1654, with a stately train of no less 
than 200 attendants, " all generally proper and handsome men," and 
arrived at Gravesend on the 18th of July. 1 He was met on the fol- 
lowing day by Coyet, who gave him a most flattering account of the 
Protector's attitude. The king's plans in the Baltic, he said, stood in 
no danger of being interrupted ; the Protector had spoken very openly 
with him. On the 28th of July, Bonde was conducted to London by 
the Protector's master of ceremonies, Oliver Fleming, where he was 
met by Whitelocke and Strickland on behalf of the Council. Three 
days of generous entertainment followed, after which came the first 
public audience. 2 "No ambassador had been received with such 
elaborate ceremony since the late king's execution," wrote one of 
Bonde's suite. 3 However, notwithstanding this flattering reception, 
the ground had been made somewhat unfavorable for Bonde by the 
well directed efforts of the Dutch ambassador, Nieupoort. After the 
treaty of peace between England and the States General in 1654, 
Nieupoort had remained in England to negotiate a further treaty con- 
cerning matters of trade and to obtain some relaxation of English 
measures directed against Dutch commerce. 4 When Charles Gustavus' 
intention of renewing the war in the North was no longer concealed, it 
became his duty to keep in touch with the Protector's views concerning 
aifairs in this region. 

The republican party in Holland under the leadership of DeWitt 
had many interests in common with Cromwell, and it was by no means 
impossible that the two leaders might agree upon a common policy in 

Plaetsen en Quartieren, jae, uyt Holland selfs, (was 't mogelyck) op Vreemde Ghewesteu te 
diverteren, tot af breuck en ruyne van de goede Ingeseetenen van de Provantie van Hollant 
en West-Vrieslandt, als mede der Stadt Amsterdam voorsz. Coppenhage, 16--26 October, 1658." 

1 Carlson gives several incorrect dates with reference to these embassies to England. 

2 This is described in detail by Whitelocke, in Memorials of English Affairs, 626. Whitelocke's 
description has been used by Masson in his account of Bonde's embassy. Life of Milton in 
Connection with the History of his Time, v., 246, seq. 

3 Extracts of Johan Ekeblad's letters have been published in Wieselgren's Dela Gardiska 
Archivet, viii., 216, seq. They bear evidence to the spirit of exalting confidence which pervaded 
the embassy. "The Dutch ask trembling what the king proposes to do," he wrote. "The Sultan 
of Turkey sent an envoy to the Prince of Siebenburgen to enquire about this king who swallows 
up whole kingdoms ; what lands he had, where they lay, etc." 

4 De Witt's Brieven, vol. iii., and Aitzema, Saken van Staet en Oorlogh, vol. iii., 1155, seq. 



26 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

the North. On May 7, 1655, 1 Nieupoort wrote that news of the siege 
of Danzig by the king of Sweden had arrived in London, causing much 
uneasiness among English merchants. He thought a proposition for 
an alliance between England, Denmark, and the Netherlands for the 
protection of the Baltic trade might be listened to. Brandenburg, 
however, was distrusted in England and could not be included. In 
his next dispatch, May 14, he tells of two conferences which he had 
with Thurloe in which his references to a possible alliance had been 
well received. The Protector, he was told, had considered the matter 
with his Council and Nieupoort's suggestions had been most agreeable. 
The Protector had expressed his surprise that Danzig did not try to 
secure allies. It was evident that the king of Sweden's movements 
were a source of some apprehension in England. On June 10, Hol- 
land ordered Nieupoort to propose to the Protector an alliance with 
Denmark and the Netherlands for the preservation of the Baltic trade. 2 
Yet it will be remembered that at this same time Covet Mas receiv- 
ing assurances from the Protector which he considered very satisfac- 
tory. It might appear at first sight as though the Protector Mas play- 
ing a double and confused part; but it seems sufficiently clear that this 
was not the case. A clue to his motives is furnished by Nieupoort's 
account of certain conferences with Thurloe. On the news of the mas- 
sacres in Piedmont, Cromwell had sent letters to the various powers in 
Europe protesting or exhorting, as the case was, and among others to 
the king of Sweden. 3 As soon as Charles Gustavus' answer had been 
received, said Thurloe, they could then confer together as to what 
course it would be best to adopt. The Protector's policy would be 
largely influenced by the nature of the king of Sweden's reply ; in the 
meantime, he could be assured that nothing would be done to prejudice 
the interests of Holland. It would be a great thing, continued Nieu- 
poort, anticipating the Protector's whole policy in the North, if the 
king of Sweden could be moved, even if through a subsidy, to turn his 
arms from the Protestant places in Prussia against the Roman Catho- 
lics in the hereditary lands of the emperor, and to consent to an agreement 

1 All of Nieupoort's and Bordeaux's dispatches are dated according to the present mode of 
reckoning. 

2 Secrete Resolutien, i., 186. Pufendorff mentions Brandenburg and Poland in this connec- 
tion, but the attempt to reconcile England and Brandenburg was a different matter, and was 
kept separate by the Dutch. The mention of Poland seems to be an error. 

3 Milton, Litene, 91 ; but undated. The date is May 25. 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 27 

with Holland, or with Holland, Denmark, and England, for the regu- 
lation of commerce in the Baltic. 1 Soon after, he suggested to Thurloe 
that Charles Gustavus might be persuaded to leave Danzig and Prus- 
sia undisturbed and seek his advantage in other quarters ; to which 
Thurloe had replied that lie would do what he could to further such 
result. 2 On July 9, Nieupoort wrote of an interview in which the Pro- 
tector had said that "he also would rather that the king of Sweden 
would leave the seaports unmolested and seek his advantage in the 
hereditary lands in the house of Austria, to which he would contribute 
what he could, and that he, too, understood perfectly the consequences 
of the present Swedish designs." The plan of a common movement 
against Austria was quite in keeping with the negotiations with France 
which he was then carrying on, and which Nieupoort was trying, not 
without some influence, to further. 

Such was the state of affairs on Bonde's arrival in England. 
Nieupoort, though he stood well with the Protector, and had actually 
anticipated and proposed the policy which the Protector was then cher- 
ishing and afterwards followed so persistently, was openly expressing 
his suspicion that England and Sweden had come to a secret under- 
standing ; 3 and was receiving in return assurances that the alliance 
with Holland was the very ground and foundation upon which subse- 
quent treaties must rest/ Cromwell, on his part, was uneasy at Swe- 
den's designs against Prussia, and was not at all inclined to permit 
them. Not only was Charles Gustavus embarking in his new war 
without first consulting the Protector, 5 but his relations with Charles 
II., though they had no particular significance, may have added to the 

i" * * * ende versoght my. flat wy niet jalours wilden wesen, dat nogh met dien Ko- 
ningh nogh met iemant anders iet soude gehandelt werden tot prejudice van onsen Staet, ende 
als se antwoordt op den voorgeroerden brief souden onlfangen hebben, dat men dan t'samen 
soude konnen overleggen, wat best soude dienen gedaen to werden ; Het soude myns be- 
dunckens al een groot werck wesen, koude die Koningh siende de animositeyt van 't Paus- 
dom in Savoyen, ende ook hoe de Roomsche Oeestelyckheyt gestadigh woelt in de Erflanden 
van den Keyser, bewogen werden, al waere het met een geldt-subsidie, als voor desen Gustavus, 
omme syne Wapenen in plaetse van tegens Protestantse Steden in Pruyssen, in de voorge- 
oemde Erflanden totafweringe van de voorgeroerde oppression te willen gebruycken, endever- 
nieuwen met onsen Staet ofte alleen, of gemeen met desen Staet ende Denemarcken, een 
defensive Alliance met ons Reglement van de Comniercie ende Navigatie op de Oost-zee." 
Nieupoort to De Witt, June 11, 1655. 

2 Nieupoort to De Witt, June 18, 1655. 

3 Ibid. 

* Ibid., July 30. 

5 Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time, Stowe MSS., clxxxv., fol. 187. 



28 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

Protector's distrust. 1 The politics of Europe were in fact in an un- 
settled and confused state, in which radical changes were easily possi- 
ble, when the occurrence of the massacres in Piedmont decided the 
Protector as to a definite line of policy. The negotiations with France, 
the Netherlands, and Sweden came to a standstill until answers to 
Cromwell's letters on this subject had been received. A great deal de- 
pended upon the attitude of Sweden, and Bonde's arrival was awaited 
with keen interest. 

Rumors and First Difficulties. — The brilliant audience and the sub- 
sequent courtesies shown the Swedish ambassador did not escape the 
attention of the foreign ministers at Westminster. The Protector 
showed Bonde great attention and often took him to Hampton Court. 
" The other ambassadors, who have be?n here a long time but can 
hardly obtain an interview with the Protector, are very jealous of us," 
wrote Ekeblad, "and cannot imagine why we are courted so." This 
conspicuous favoritism was thought to have great significance, as in- 
deed it had ; but those who had most to fear from an English-Swedish 
alliance inferred too much from it. " I have advertisement from Eng- 
land from a very good hand, that there has been long a very good un- 
derstanding between the king of Sweden and Cromwell," wrote 
Charles II. 's secretary of state. " I have also advertisement, that 
Cromwell and the Swedish ambassador are exceedingly intimate. They 
dine, sup, hunt, and play at bowls together, and never was ambassador, 
or indeed any man, so much caressed and regarded by Cromwell as 
this man is (who is a person of great esteem in Swedland), nor did he 
ever seek the friendship of any one so much as of this king of Swede. 
Some believe that France will also join with these, but I know not how 
that may stand with the interest of France, for I am persuaded that 
Sweden and Cromwell will endeavour to render themselves the protec- 
tors of all the reformed churches in Germany, France, etc., or at least 
procure from them all a kind of dependence on these godly reformers. 
* * I am persuaded that if there be any such close league between 

1 Charles Gustavus sent a letter to Charles II. announcing his accession, in which he gave 
him the title King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, and professed his good will and de- 
sire to assist. A copy of it, together with Charles' reply, came into Thurloe's hands (Clar. S. P., 
xlix., fol. 333). Correspondents sent in alarming rumors of intended Swedish aid to Charles 
II. Charles sent an ambassador, Sir Wm. Bellenden, to Sweden, who of course accomplished 
nothing. "The king is kindly disposed, but cannot alter at once what has been done by the 
queen," he wrote. Nicholas Papers, ii., 73. All this was of little or no importance, yet Crom- 
well was sensitive on this point, and it may have had some influence. 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 29 

Cromwell and Sweden, one part of the design is to make Sweden 
master of the Baltic Sea, and that therein, and otherwise, it may prove 
as ruinous to the States as to many others." l 

This rumor found credence elsewhere, to the benefit of both Crom- 
well and Charles Gustavus. On the one hand, Spain turned a deaf 
ear for a time to the appeals of Charles II., 2 while on the other hand 
not only was Austria discouraged from actively supporting Poland, 3 
but the Dutch wisely refrained from assuming an aggressive attitude, 
which would certainly have offended the Protector and lessened the 
chances for a peaceful settlement. 

However, notwithstanding these marked favors, Bonde's efforts to 
hasten the negotiations met at first with no success. Bonde might re- 
ceive the most dinners, but Meupoort received the most conferences, 
and Dutch interests had full hearing. Bonde, like his royal master, 
stood very much on his dignity. He complained that there was no 
proper place for him to confer with any one. He could not visit Thur- 
loe at his house, like a private solicitor, he said, as the Dutch ambassa- 
dor did. To be sure, commissioners were appointed to confer with 
him, with whom he had his first conference on August 1 5 ; but Strick- 
land, who was thought to favor the Dutch strongly, was one of the 
number, which made Bonde cautious, while the commissioners on their 
part were extremely noncommittal. They dare not for their lives com- 
mit themselves to anything, he wrote. It was evident that while the 
Protector was willing to hear what Bonde had to propose, he was not 
prepared as yet to go further. Not only did his ill health, the nego- 
tiations with France, and other matters engage his attention at this 
time, but it was no easy matter to reconcile Charles Gustavus' plans 
with his own. The very reason why the Swedes were so anxious for 
an English alliance was the reason why the English were unwilling 

1 Nicholas to Jos. Jane. S. P., Dom., Interreg., c, fol. 84. 

2 ( ,'harles II.'s ambassador at Madrid, Sir Henry Bennet, sent most discouraging reports. See 
letter* to Hyde in Clarendon State Papers. " Indeed their [the Spaniards'] wariness in offend- 
ing those [the English] , who insult them upon every day with doing them new injuries, I cannot 
enough wonder at, or that they can still imagine it possible to enter upon a new treaty with 
them." Hyde to Sir H. de Vic, Clar. S. P., 1., fol. 233. 

;! Pribram, Archiv fiir Oesterreichische Geschichte, lxxv., 430. Pribram, however, puts it a 
trifle too strong when he says, ' Am Hofe Charles II. hat man nie gezweifelt dass welterschut- 
ternde Plane getroffen waren." They were strongly inclined to believe it, it is true, but they 
would hardly have sent an ambassador to Charles Gustavus (p. 28, note) had they not thought 
there was still some hope of the contrary. "If there be una such close league," said Nicholas in 
the letter quoted above. 



30 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

to grant it. Charles Fleetwood told Bonde in an important interview, 1 
that " not only the Protector, but everybody who understood such mat- 
ters, saw that a nearer alliance with Sweden was of the greatest im- 
portance to England, and that Bonde's proposals were most advan- 
tageous ; but the cause of the long hesitancy had been the help which 
the king wished in the Baltic, which seemed directed against Holland. 
England was now at peace with that power, and the Protector consid- 
ered himself in honor bound not to break it." 2 Another cause for 
the delay was the awaiting the outcome of the negotiations with 
France, to which the Piedmont incident had offered some hinderance. 3 
The choice between an alliance with France or Spain was the founda- 
tion upon which the Protector's whole foreign policy rested, and with 
it his policy in the North. He could not well proceed with the latter 
until the former had been settled beyond question. "The peace with 
France was followed with a war with Spain, and all future treaties 
were for the most part managed with some reference thereunto." 4 

Cromwell's Policy in the North. — The Piedmont massacres and the 
peace with France were two events which clarified the Protector's 
foreign relations. After this, his aims were clear and his methods of 
reaching them simple. It may perhaps be well at this point to take a 
more careful survey of Cromwell's policy in the North, of which we 
have already had glimpses in Nieupoort's letters. 

In all the Protector's foreign relations, there were three objects 
which he never lost sight of: 1. The maintenance and extension of the 
Protestant religion. 2. The prevention of the restoration of Charles 
II. 3. The encouragement and protection of English trade. 

1. The tendency of recent historians of the English Puritan Revolu- 
tion is to lay greater stress on its religious character. That religious 
hatred which on the Continent had found free play in the Thirty 
Years' War, and had burnt itself out to a certain extent, had been 
pent up in England only to break out fiercer than ever in shame at the 
ignoble part England had played in this struggle. Cromwell shared 
with his party its over-wrought religious feeling, its savage intoler- 

1 October 23, 1655. Kalling, p. 27, seq. 

- " De Heer Protector heeft my rondt uyt verseeckert, dat hy ten aensien van Sweden geen 
offres ofte invitatie, dat waeren de eygen woorden, soude aennemen als geraeen met Hollandt." 
Nieupoort to De Witt, October 29, 1055. 

3 Nieupoort to De Witt, August 20, 1655. 

4 Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time. 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 31 

ance in matters of creed, and its constant dread of a violent Catholic 
reaction. 1 Already in January, 1654, he thought he saw clear signs 
of the coming storm. He informed the Swiss ambassador that the 
Pope had formed a plan for reconciling the ancient rivalry between 
France and Spain and turning their united arms against the Protest- 
ants, first in Switzerland and then in the rest of the world. An alli- 
ance between England, Switzerland, and the Netherlands seemed to him 
the only means of averting the disaster. 2 When the massacres occurred 
in Piedmont, the already excited public went into a panic over the event 
and saw in it only the beginning of a series of similar horrors, all 
instigated by the Romish Antichrist. The part which Cromwell played 
in this matter is well known. It seems to me, in fact, to mark the 
point at which his hitherto somewhat vague plans for a Protestant alli- 
ance took definite form. 3 Considerations of religion took for a time 
precedence in his councils over all other interests (p. 41). A treaty 
with France was preferred to one with Spain for this among other rea- 
sons, 4 and a plan for a P rotestant counter-alliance was conceived whic h 

iHe also shared the prevailing illusion that Charles Gustavus was a second Sustavus 
Adolphus. See Killing's account of his first private interview with Bonde, also his speech to 
Parliament post. Even in Scotland this idea was prevalent among the Puritans. "A. long 
tract of dreams I have on the success of Charles, if God help him to begin where his heroic 
uncle Gustave left, but all these I put in God's hands, who knoweth his own appointments." 
Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie, A. M„ Principal of the University of Glasgow, iii., 371. 
" For myself, since the battle of Leipsig, I have loved the house of Sweden to this day above 
all o: her foreigners, and by the strange successes God gives to their valour, I expect more good 
to the Church from them than from any others ; however, that unhappy Christina's apostasy 
and after miscarriages, has grieved my heart." Ibid., iii., 370. " I wish Brandenburg may re- 
turn to his old postour, and not draw on himself next the Swedish armies, which the Lord tor- 
bid ; for after Sweden, we love Brandenburg next." Ibid., iii., 371. " Det gemena folket talar 
uppenbarligen pa borsen och gatorna, att alia larda man hafva visat utaf Daniels Prophetia 
och andraskal, att en Konung i Sverigc och England skola omkullkasta Pafvarnas sate och 
gifva den sanna Guds akallen ater sitt ratta flor och bruk igen." Bonde's letter of August 23, 
1655. Kalling, p. 18, note 1. ■ ,'. . , 

2For this incident, as well as for the religious character of the Protector's policy m general, 
see Stern's "Oliver Cromwell und die evangelischen Kan tone der Schweiz," in Sybel's His- 
torisehe Zeitschrift, xl., pp 52-99. 

3 How prevalent the idea of a Protestant union was at that time, not only in England, but in 
the Protestant world at large, is shown by Rakoczy's sending an ambassador in the latter part 
of 1634 to Sweden. Denmark, the Netherlands, and England, asking to be included m any such 
alliance which might be formed between them. The ambassador was everywhere well re- 
ceived. On May 4, 1655, he had audience in London, but it was May 24 before he was able to 
present his mission to the Protector. (The original is in the British Museum, Add. MSS. , 4156, 
fol. 174.) Alexander Szilagyi, in Ungarische Revue, 1892, p. 635. The Protector took great in- 
terest in the Prince of Transylvania. Urk. u. Actenst, vii., 730. 

i " \n alliance with France was most agreeable to the strict intelligence the Protector had, 
and intended to have with Sweden and other princes and states in those parts, which were of 
the same interest." Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time. " He intended a good cor- 
respondence with the Protestants of France, and to lay the foun Nation thereof in his interposi- 
tions to the French king on their behalf, that their edict for liberty of conscience might be 



32 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

should include not only the powers of the North, but Transylvania, 
Brandenburg, and even France. Brandenburg was given to under- 
stand that an ambassador would be well received in London and that 
the negotiations with Sweden would be delayed somewhat to that 
purpose. 1 

2. This plan of a great Protestant alliance is the key to Cromwell's 
foreign policy. If it could be realized it would be found to have very 
desirable consequences in other than strictly religious matters. One 
of the chief dangers which threatened the Protector was the incessant 
plots of the royalists, who found support and comfort wherever Crom- 
well had enemies. So long as he had enemies he could not hope 
to isolate diaries II. entirely, but his point would be as good as won 
if he could force the king to throw himself into the arms of the Catho- 
lics. The proposed alliance would have accomplished this result. 
Charles would have been deprived of the support of the Dutch, the 
active assistance of Brandenburg would cease, and, especially, the sup- 
port of France and consequently that of the Scotch, would be taken 
away. Charles II. would be thrown into the arms of the Spaniards 
and the Irish, of all nations the most hated in England. With the 
royal cause identified in the minds of the English and Scotch with 
these intense national animosities, sharpened by religious antipathies, 
Cromwell could feel himself from this side fairly secure. 2 

3. The general alliance would have the final advantage of bringing 
order into the chaos of commercial relations in the North. 

Cromwell, with all his religious fervor, did not underestimate the 
advantages of trade. On the contrary, he regarded it as a producer 

observed to them, whereby, and doing them on all occasions other good offices, the oppor- 
tunity whereof a good intelligence with the crown itself could only give him, he might draw 
them into a dependence upon himself and make and preserve an interest in France in all 
events, and do that also which would be mo«t acceptable to England and to all other Protes- 
tants in the world, whose cause and interest he professedly asserted, as the head and Protec- 
tor of them, and he had not a greater consideration than this, in casting his alliance that way 
and in making war against Spain and the house of Austria, the head and Protector of the 
Papists." lb. " Ick ben bedught ten aensien van de rupture met Spanie, dat men sigh hier 
ten hooghsten sal gelegen laeten wesen om Sweden tegens den Keyser te engageren, ende een 
Ligue Offensive ende Defensive op te reghten tegens net Huys van Oostenryck, funderende 
deselve principalyken op net interest van de Religie." Nieupoort to De Witt, October 22, 1655. 
There was much truth in Cromwell's remark to Schlezer that he had preferred a French to a 
Spanish alliance from considerations of religion. Schlezer to the Great Elector, December 
14, 1655. Urk. u. Actenst., vii., 729. 

!TJrk. u. Actenst., vii., 717. 

2 Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time. The Clarendon State Papers are our chief 
source of information for the royalist plots. 



CROMWELL, AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 33 

of the sinews of war. 1 The Navigation Act and the eiforts of the 
Trade and Navigation Committee need only be mentioned in this 
connection. It was not indifference to these interests, therefore, which 
caused him to hold aloof from Charles Gustavus' offers of privileges in 
the Baltic, but the unsatisfactoriness of the oifers and the momentous 
consequences which their acceptance would have involved. Nieupoort 
was repeatedly assured that the Protector understood perfectly the 
consequences of the Swedish designs against Prussia. Cromwell's 
acceptance of Charles Gustavus' proposals Would have meant more than 
Swedish control of the Baltic with all the evil consequences which that 
involved. It would have brought about just that unfavorable politi- 
cal combination which he tried until the end to prevent. Charles 
Gustavus would have been called off from his conquest of Poland and 
his expected invasion of Austria, to turn his arms against Brandenburg, 
Prussia, and Denmark; and Brandenburg, Denmark, and Holland 
would have been added to the Protector's already sufficiently long list 
of enemies. The dangers of such a course were plain, but the benefits 
not so evident. 

It had always been the policy of nations having commercial inter- 
ests in the Baltic to keep the control of the ports in this region di- 
vided, not only on account of the customs duties, but because this was 
the great source of ship-building supplies, which could not be allowed 
to fall into the hands of any one power. I can find no evidence to 
show that the Protector was ever tempted to abandon this policy to 
secure special trading privileges. Nor, indeed, until, as we shall 
see, at the very last, when the control of affairs in the North was slip- 
ping from his hands, was he willing at any price to allow the exten- 
sion of Swedish power over the Baltic. 2 This may perhaps be ex- 
plained in part by the fact that he appears never to have mastered the 
details of the complicated affairs in the North, and was, in consequence, 

i Carlyle, Speech XVIII. 

- " Nam Borussiam tanquain granarium Europte haut tuto Svecorum arbitrio concedi insin- 
uabant." Puf., ii., § 89. " Eoque Regem ad pacem cum Polonis ineundam urgebant, ac ut 
Borussia decederet, qnam ipsam & Cromvellus, amicissimum se quamvis professus, ipsi in- 
videbat; ac ut alibi emolumentum suuni qu;ereret volebat." Ibid., iv., §45. " Ick kan wel 
bemercken, datse gantsch ongaerne souden sieu dat Deuemarcken of door Tractaet of door 
Waepenen aen Sweden soude vastgemaeckt werden." Nieupoort to De Witt, Brieven, iii., 92. 
" * * * i'on est icy bien aise de le voir puissant et capable de donner de la jalousie a la 
Maison d'Autriche, mais aussy peut on trouver quelque inconvenient que tout les Ports de la 
mer Baltique tombent soubz une mesme puissance, et lorsque l'interest particulier le permet, 
les Ministres de cet Estat, sont aussez bons mesnagers." Bordeaux to Brienne, July 17, 165(J. 
3 



34 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

disinclined to break with the traditional policy of all commercial na- 
tions having interests there. 1 At any rate, he assured Schlezer that 
his concern was not so much to secure minor trading privileges, but 
that the dominium maris might be properly divided. If this were 
maintained, other matters would right themselves. 2 

But while the Protector could not bring himself to support Charles 
Gustavus in his effort to unite all the countries about the Baltic into a 
new kingdom of the North, which would have controlled the tolls and 
the maritime supplies of the Baltic, neither could he look on idly while 
the Dutch and Danes destroyed the power of Sweden. His interest 
lay in maintaining the present balance and in keeping matters in this 
region quiet. If Sweden could only be brought to direct its arms in 
the proper channel, namely, against Austria, all this unrest in the 
North would cease. With the Protestant alliance an accomplished 
fact, the Dutch need not fear for their commerce, and the Swedes, un- 
deterred by fear of Dutch and Danish forces in their rear, could in- 
vade Austria, and, if they chose, extend their conquests in this direc- 
tion to the Caspian Sea. 3 

Thus, the whole northern policy of Cromwell may be summed up in 
one phrase, the general Protestant alliance. All his foreign under- 
takings, and he had a great many, would be served by it, and could be 
stated in terms of it. That many motives were involved in it there 
can be no doubt. I shall not attempt to decide which was the domi- 
nant one. Perhaps Cromwell himself hardly knew, for religious and 
worldly interests were inextricably interwoven in the politics of the 
17th century. But we can at least say that it was the religious motive 
which furnished the key to the solution of the complicated problem. 
Coining between the religious wars of the first half of the 17th century 
and the dynastic and commercial Avars of the second half, it is not to 
be wondered at that Cromwell's policy was influenced by each of these 

1 "Er k'onnte von den Ursachen der Misshelligkeit, die zwischen E. Ch. D. und deni Konig 
entstanden waren, nichts bestandiges sagen, und es wiirde ihm nicht zu verdenken sein, wenn 
er sich so eben nicht wiirde darin finden konnen ; dann die Oerter waren etwas weit abgele- 
gen ; hatte keine eigentliche Gemeinschaft mit diesen Landen : die Interesse, die jura, die 
privilegia waren etwas verwickelt und hieselbst nicht so gar wohl bekannt." Urk. u. Actenst., 
vii.,734. Also, lb., p. 715. 

- " Denn der Herr Protector hat die Maxime, dass er sich nicht urn die Cominercien so gross, 
als urn das dominium maris (denen jene folgen miisscn) bekummert." Ibid., 737. 

3 Kalling, p. 24. The Protector was indeed willing that Charles Gustavus should extend his 
conquests from Poland south to the Caspian Sea, but he was not willing that he should conquer 
the territory from Poland north to the Baltic Sea 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 35 

interests, and, according to the course of political events, in varying 
degrees. 

Progress of the Negotiations ; New Difficulties. — On the 24th of 
October the treaty with France was brought to a conclusion. On the 
2d of November there were signs that the Council was ready to take 
up the Swedisli negotiations, for a committee was appointed to confer 
with the Protector concerning certain matters communicated by the 
Swedish ambassador. On the 14th of November a new committee was 
appointed to take the same matter in hand, and was ordered to meet 
daily until they had prepared something to offer, and "to report the 
same with all possible speed." 1 

Yet the negotiations did not make the progress Bonde desired. 
The Protector's suspicions had been aroused that the king's religious 
pretensions were not entirely sincere. Bonde's statement to the first 
commissioners was unfortunate and may have come to the Protector's 
ear. 2 Though Bonde afterwards adopted a different tone, as in his 
interview with Fleetwood, October 25, and endeavored to give all his 
proposals a religions color, the Protector was suspicious. It was 
nothing new, he said to Schlezer, to use religion as a cloak for one's 
ambition. 3 Nor did Charles Gustavus improve matters by granting 
religious toleration to the Catholics in Poland, for though Cromwell 
was exceedingly tolerant towards Protestant sects, his toleration did 
not extend even in the slightest degree to the adherents of Rome. 
Bonde had, indeed, a difficult role to play, and though it is not clear 
how he could have proceeded differently, the impression he made was 
not favorable. It Mas doubted whether he had sufficient instructions 
to enter into an alliance such as was desired. 

The Protector always preferred playing the part of hammer to 
that of anvil ; consequently, whenever negotiations proceeded unsatis- 

1 S. P. Dom., Interreg., lxxvi., 364 and 374. 

'- " The Protestant religion had now nothing to fear," he said to the English commissioners 
at their first meeting. "The Catholics had made no attack on it except in Savoy, and that was 
a matter of little importance." Railing, p. 17. "As for religion," Bonde wrote to Charles Gus- 
tavus, " it could, to be sure, be made to serve as a basis for a closer alliance, but the mention of 
it in the treaty should be avoided ; for its main purpose is to protect religion and its confessors 
in case they are attacked by Catholics, but not to try to convert the Catholics or persecute 
them through a Protestant inquisition : but to allow them free exercise of their rights so long 
as they do not plot against us, and to seek to influence them through kindness." lb., p. 17. I 
do not know whether this was Charles Gustavus' opinion also. In response to Cromwell's let- 
ter concerning these massacres, he had sent a protest to the Duke of Savoy, which is now in 
the archives at Turin (Lettere di principi. Svezia). 

3 Schlezer to the Great Elector, Januarv n, 1656. Urk. u. Actenst.. vii., 733. 



36 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

factorily, or visiting ambassadors tried to avoid the direct issue and to 
bargain with him, he immediately began to discuss the plan of treat- 
ing through his own ambassador at the other court. Nieupoort had 
noticed the Protector's dissatisfaction and had encouraged it. The 
plan of sending an ambassador to Charles Gustavus in Poland was 
earnestly debated for some time, but the obstacles seemed insurmount- 
able. Not only did there seem to be no suitable person to send, but 
the journey to Poland at this time of the year was so toilsome and 
dangerous, and the communication so difficult, that Thurloe told Nieu- 
poort it might perhaps be better to begin the negotiations with Bonde, 
trusting that his instructions would prove sufficient. 1 

Bonde's impatience had at last grown so demonstrative 2 that it was 
necessary to make some show of coming to the point. Accordingly, 
on December 5, three commissioners were named to carry on the 
negotiations. They were Whitelocke, 3 Strickland, and Fiennes. It 
was by these that the commercial treaty of July 17 was signed. The 
matter of a closer alliance was negotiated by Bonde partly with them, 

1 Nieupoort to Do Witt, November 19 and 26. Edward Rolt, who had been sent to the king of 
Sweden with the Protector's ratification of the treaty of Upsala, was now with the king in 
Poland, begging constantly to be recalled. He received many marks of preference and honor, 
which of course did not escape the attention of the other ambassadors there, but his mission 
appears to have had no further significance. No news had been received from him for a num- 
ber of weeks, which must have convinced the Protector of the futility of sending another 
ambassador thither. Rolfs instructions and dispatches are printed in volumes iii. and iv. of 
the Thurloe Papers. The instructions are undated, but I judge from internal evidence that 
they were written between the 10th and ISth of July, 1655. 

2 Whitelockc's Memorials, p. 633. 

3 Whitelocke was the most favorably inclined towards Sweden of any one of influence in 
England. His partisanship appeared indeed so marked that he was taken severely to account 
for it in the Council, and when he attended Bonde's reception of the birth of the young Prince 
Charles of Sweden, he tells us that the Dutch ambassador treated him coldly. " It was a very 
great feast of seven courses, the Swedish ambassador was very courteous to me, but the Dutch 
and others were reserved towards me, and I as much to them." Memorials, p. 634. He was 
naturally proud of his treaty of Upsala, 1654, and was anxious that something further should 
come of it. He appears to have formed a friendship with the Swedish chancellor, ErikOx- 
enstierna, during the latter part of his stay in Sweden. Fries, Erik Oxenstierna, p. 140. Coyet 
had instructions to visit him with assurances of the king's esteem, and to ask his advice as to 
the best method of proceeding in the objects of his mission. Instructions, § 9. Bonde sent his 
secretary with greetings as soon as he had landed at Gravesend, and it was his great desire to 
have Whitelocke appointed commissioner, which was prevented for some time by the strained 
relations between Whitelocke and Cromwell, though his knowledge of Swedish affairs and 
trade was of course very extensive. His name occurs constantly in connection with this em- 
bassy, and he is always to a remarkable degree friendly to Sweden. He was also a member 
of the new Trade and Navigation Committee. His Memorials of the English Affairs contains 
copious references to the negotiations after the appointment of the new commissioners on De- 
cember 5, 1655, just at the point where Railing's narrative breaks off. The references in the 
following pages to the Memorials arc to the folio edition of 1732, or to the marginal pagination 
of the Oxford edition of 1853. 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 37 

but principally with the Protector himself. Bonde's diary gives the 
dates but not the subject-matter of audiences which began to be fre- 
quent at this time, and which he tells us were important. Nieupoort 
also had more frequent audiences, and his letters become more in- 
structive. 

Yet if Bonde expected that now finally his mission would make 
some progress, he was destined to be again disappointed. Another 
cause of suspicion and delay had arisen, for Charles Gustavus had 
turned his arms against the Elector of Brandenburg. It is true the 
initiative had been taken by Brandenburg, but Cromwell could nut be 
expected from the fragmentary reports which reached him to know 
this. He saw in it an attack on a Protestant prince (though to be 
sure an unfriendly one), for the purpose of getting control of Prussia. 
There were omnious signs of his displeasure. His relations with the 
Dutch ambassador became more cordial and confidential. Bonde ex- 
plained as best he could, but with little success, and it was even said 
that when he began as usual to testify to his royal master's devotion 
to the Protestant cause, the Protector had interrupted him. The 
project of sending an English ambassador thither was revived, and, 
naturally, the Dutch encouraged the plan. 1 Whitelocke's name had been 
mentioned very early, but he appears to have been somewhat distrusted. 
At last, however, it was decided to send him in company with Chris- 
topher Pack, the lord mayor of London. 2 But Whitelocke objected 
strenuously, and " endeavoured by all handsome pretences to be excused 
that service." 3 On the 14th of January Nieupoort wrote that the 
Protector had said, " If the king of Sweden desisted, well and good, 
but if he continued, he would require something else than ambassa- 
dors." 4 

The news that he had desisted was .received by the Protector with 
great pleasure, and in a reply to a letter announcing the birth of the 

1 De Witt to Nieupoort, January 7, 1656. 

2 He was later the mover of the Petition and Advice. 

3 This incident attracted considerable attention at the time. Whitelocke devotes considera- 
ble space to it. Memorials, 633, seq. See alsoNieupoort's dispatches and Pufendorff, iii., §76. 

4 " * * de Heer Protector seyde, * * dat hy albereyts met ernst over de sacken van den 
Koningh van Polen ende Pruyssen met Bond en Cojet hadt gesproocken, dat hy nogh naeder 
met haer soude handelen, end byaldien de Koningh van Sweden desisteert, dat het dan wel 
soude wesen, maer gaet hy voort, dat'er wat anders als Ambassadeurs sal vereyscht worden." 
Thurloe assured Nieupoort that Kngland and Holland " niet superficielycken maer inner- 
lycken aen den anderen moesten gebonden houden." Ibid. 



88 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

young prince of Sweden he expresses his satisfaction at the treaty 
of Konigsberg in the following terms : " For we make no question 
but the wresting of the kingdom of Poland by your arms from the 
Papal Empire, as it were a horn from the head of the Beast, and your 
peace made with the Duke of Brandenburg, to the great satisfaction of 
all the pious, though with growls from your adversaries, will be of 
very great consequence for the peace and profit of the Church. May 
God grant an end worthy of such worthy beginnings ! " ' This " we 
look upon here as a very good advantage to the Protestant cause," 
wrote Thurloe, " hoping that if the Swede can settle his aifairs in those 
parts, he may be a great succour to the Protestants, who are every- 
where threatened by the Popish party." 2 

Both these letters bear traces of the renewed apprehension of Cath- 
olic aggression which spread over England at this time. 3 The Pope 
was endeavoring to effect a union of France and Spain, and it was re- 
ported that Queen Christina was going to Paris in the interest of it. 
"The general peace between the Popish party advanceth," wrote 
Thurloe to General Montague on April 28. "It is probable that a 
truce may be agreed upon between Spain and France for six years," 
he wrote on the 13th. 4 These movements were watched closely by the 
Protector. They were partly favorable and partly unfavorable to the 
Swedish designs ; for while they made him more zealous in the cause 
of the Protestant union, he was still less inclined to proceed in it with- 
out the Dutch. If a Catholic league were effected, it would as a 

1 Milton, Literee, 110. See Masson, v., 246, seq., whose translation I have used, for a detailed 
account of this letter ; but he seems to me to miss the point of it when he ascribes its lauda- 
tory tone merely to a desire to propitiate the king for the delay in Bonde's negotiations. This 
explanation would rob the passage I have quoted of its significance. As a matter of fact the 
Protector was in good humor with Charles Gustavus for the moment, and for the reasons given. 

2 Thurloe to Pell, February 7, 1(555-6. Landsdowne MSS., 753, fol. 259. See also Urk. u. 
Actenst., vii., 735. 

3,1 Wie ihrn aber sei, so wird man alhier je langer je mehr in der Opinion confirmiret, dass 
aus dem jetzigen Wcsen ein rechter generaler und pur lauterer Religionskrieg werden werde." 
Schlezer to the Great Elector, March 16. Urk. u. Actenst., vii., 741. Ibid., 747. 

4 Carte MSS., lxxiv., fol. 52 and 54. Also Puf., ii., §91. It was this lack of cordiality and mu- 
tual trust that prevented the co-operation of England and France in the North, notwithstanding 
the similarity of their aims, of which they were fully conscious. "* * * il est d'ailleurs, 
autant de l'interest du Protecteur que de Sa Ma'te que la tranquillitene soit pas si establie en 
Allemagne, ny les jalousies si esteintes, que les Forces de l'Empereur ayent liberte de venir a 
la solde d'Espagne." Bordeaux to Brienne, May 22. "Je parlay [to Thurloel des Differens 
entre le Protectour et des Provinces-Unies, et soubz les nom des cellcs-cy, des affaires de Suede, 
de la jalousie que ses progrez luy donnoient, et de 1' a vantage que la France et 1' Anglet're re- 
cevroient si ceste Couronne tournoit ses armes contre le pays de ceux qui envoyent du se- 
cours a l'Espagne." lb., June 26. 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 39 

matter of course espouse the cause of Charles II. It was impossible 
to drive the Dutch and Brandenburg to that side also. 

The first stage in the realization of the Protector's great foreign 
policy remained, therefore, now, as before, the pacification of the 
powers of the North. The Treaty of Konigsberg did not bring this 
about, but it was a long step in that direction. The more difficult task 
of reconciling Sweden and the Netherlands yet remained. " It is true," 
wrote Thurloe, 1 " there is some jealousy between him [Charles Gusta- 
vus] and the Dutch, and some unkindnesses have passed between them, 
but my Lord Protector is resolved to use all possible endeavours to 
unite and reconcile them." 1 

Two Proposals for an Alliance. — On January 31, after much im- 
patient chafing on the part of the Swedish ambassador, articles for a 
treaty on the basis of this policy were submitted to him. But the as- 
tonishment with which they were received, betrays at once how much 
the demands of Charles Gustavus and Cromwell were at variance and 
how little Bonde had succeeded in fathoming Cromwell's real inten- 
tions. 3 In an interview with Charles Fleetwood, Bonde expressed 
his indignation without measure, 3 though to the English commissioners 
he appears to have been more reserved. "The ambassador seemed 
much unsatisfied with divers parts of the articles," says Whitelocke, 
" and said that he had no commission to treat of any matter con- 
cerning the United Provinces to be included, and was much nettled 
at that business. In discourse touching a general union of the Pro- 
testant interests, he said it would be a difficult work ; and as for his 
master's falling upon the emperor, he said that they in Sweden did 
not wish it to be so, because they doubted that then Sweden would be 

1 In the letter to Pell quoted above. 

2 Bonde would not have been so taken aback at the nature of these proposals if he had had 
the privilege of reading Nieupoort's dispatches. As early as September 28, Nieupoort had 
written : " * * * de Protector seyde, dat het best soude wesen Sweden mede te bewegen tot 
een gemeene Alliancie met hem, Engelandt, Denemarcken, de Geunieerde Provincien, ende 
den Keurvorst van Brandenburgh op te reghten, in dewelcke men den anderen soude verseeck- 
eren de vryheyt van de Commercie ende Navigatie." " * * * hy [Cromwell] meende om 
een vast ende solide werck te maken, dat men Sweden behoorde te inviteren, omme met desen 
Staet, Denemarcken, de Geunieerde Provincien ende den Heer Keurvorst een naeder defen- 
sive Ligue te maken, ende voorts discourerende, seyde, dat als men die ook offensive soude 
willen maken, tegens het Huys van Oostenryck, dat Vranckryek daer mede wel toe be te 
brengen soude wesen." Nieupoort to De Witt, January 14, 1656. One infers from various 
phrases in Pufendorff that Cromwell had endeavored to make the matter clear, but that Bonde, 
in his impetuous desire to believe otherwise, did not give the Protector's words due weight. 

3 Pufendorff, iii., §77. 



40 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

neglected. He declared his opinion to be, not to meddle with the 
great business of the Protestant Union ; nor to have to do with the 
United Provinces in this or any other treaty ; but he said that they 
might send to the king his master at their pleasure, and have a fitting 
answer." ' Cromwell's suspicions that Bonde was not authorized to 
enter into an agreement such as he desired was well founded. 

The negotiations were scarcely interrupted by this disagreement. In 
consequence of the Protector's proposal to send an ambassador to 
Charles Gustavus, new instructions had been sent Bonde, which he re- 
ceived on February 8, so that the conferences could be resumed with 
hardly an interruption, with wider powers and better prospect of suc- 
cess. The favorable outcome of the mission still seemed by no means 
improbable. There had been from the first two possible ways of com- 
ing to an agreement; either Cromwell might be bribed, as it were, to 
undertake with Sweden the spoliation of the Dutch trade, or Charles 
Gustavus must allow his arms to be directed against Austria. The 
first alternative had already proved impracticable. Bonde was in- 
structed not to renew his offers of trading privileges, since the English 
did not appreciate their value. But it seemed that Charles Gustavus 
must be driven to accept the second alternative. Affairs in Poland 
were such that the support of Cromwell seemed indispensable to Swe- 
den. Lisola reported at the close of 1655 that everybody in the king's 
following admitted that another war must follow the one then in prog- 
ress, though there was a difference of opinion as to with whom. Some 
thought with Austria, some with Russia or the Turk, some with Den- 
mark. If it proved to be with Austria, England and Sweden would 
have a common cause ; if with Russia, England could be of the great- 
est aid in destroying the port of Archangel and drawing the Russian 
trade to the Baltic; if with Denmark, the Netherlands must first be 
overthrown, to which end the support of England was indispensable. 2 
Nevertheless, Charles Gustavus could not bring himself to make the 
required concession. He tried in an ingenious manner to avoid the di- 
rect issue. But no subterfuge could be ingenious enough to satisfy 
Cromwell, who was not the man to be either trifled or bargained with. 3 
The unsuccessful outcome of Sonde's mission could now be foreseen. 

1 Whitelocke's Memorials, 634. 

2 Ferdinand Hirsch in Sybel's Historisohe Zeitschrift, lx., 478. 

3 Gardiner, vii., 194. 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 41 

"The Swedish ambassador/' says Whitelocke, "received new ad- 
vices from the king his master, concerning the great business of unit- 
ing the Protestant interest; and owned that he had sufficient instruc- 
tions to conclude upon the general ; but that particulars could not so 
soon be determined, nor so well as upon the place; that it would be a 
difficult matter to unite the several Protestants who have different in- 
terests, and that it would prove a long business : therefore his opin- 
ion was, that it was not a seasonable time for a general union of the 
Protestant interest. But that if the king of Sweden and the Protector 
made a conjunction first, they might fall upon the emperor and the 
house of Austria, which would be of great advantage to England, es- 
pecially now they had war with Spain : and that some supply of money 
and men aiforded to the king upon such a design, would be of more 
benefit to the Protector than the sending out of great fleets to the 
Indies, and to the coast of Spain, which would return no benefit to 
this nation." But "the opinion of the Swedish ambassador was 
plainly to be collected, not to admit the Dutch to be joined in a treaty 
with us." ' On February 15, a plan for an alliance, ostensibly on this 
basis, was presented by Bonde, the details of which are stated so con- 
cisely by Whitelocke that I shall quote the passage below. 2 

The negotiations for the next few weeks turned upon this Swedish 
proposal. Cromwell, in his desire to keep the peace with Holland and 
to direct the Swedish arms against Austria, demanded that the alliance 
be directed expressly against Austria, Poland, and Charles Stuart. 
Charles Gustavus, however, in spite of what Bonde said to the con- 
trary, wanted to leave the matter of attacking Austria more or less 
open, to be decided according to the future course of events; but the 
treaty of alliance must be so worded as to be effective against the 
Dutch and Danes. Consequently, he demanded thatr no party should 
be expressly named, but that it should be made against all their ene- 
mies. If Cromwell would not guarantee him his Polish conquests, 
especially against Denmark and the Netherlands, he wrote on January 
20, the alliance would be of little advantage to him. 3 Cromwell, on 
the other hand, demanded that the league should be offensive and 

1 Whitelocke, Memorials, 633. 

- They are also given by Pufendorff (iii., g 75) under date of January 6, presumably the date 
of the instructions which Bonde received on February 8. 
3 Pufendorff, iii., § 75. 



42 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

defensive, in order that he might be sure that Charles Gustavus would 
carry out the agreement. But Charles Gustavus wanted a defensive 
league only. Cromwell's proposal, he said, would be regarded and 
accepted by Austria as a declaration of war. Finally, while both 
Cromwell and Charles Gustavus professed to have no stronger interest 
than the maintenance of the Protestant cause and the promotion of the 
Protestant union, they disagreed as to the best method of bringing it 
about. Cromwell was for immediate union of all the Protestant pow- 
ers. Bonde dwelt upon the difficulties of such an ambitious plan, and 
proposed the anion of England and Sweden as a beginning, to which 
other powers could afterwards be drawn in. Even Nieupoort objected 
to Cromwell's plan as too ambitious, 1 but it seems to me characteristic 
of its author. All these differences appeared during the whole course 
of the ensuing negotiations, and both sides held to their views with 
great presistency. 

That the negotiations proceeded so slowly is explained by the 
Protector's occupation with other matters. The complaint of the 
slowness with which business was dispatched was general among the 
ambassadors. It was almost impossible to obtain audience. 2 Conse- 
quently, though Bonde's proposition was made February 15, it was 
some weeks before he began to realize that they were to be of no avail. 
But as the prospect for an agreement became more distant and it 
began to be evident that the king had all and more than he could at- 
tend to in Poland, the Protector began to grow cold. 3 At this Bonde's 
wrath knew no bounds. He was endowed with a full share of north- 
ern vigor, and expressed himself accordingly. " In his country," he 
said to Whitelocke, " when a man professed sincerity, they understood 
it to be plain and clear dealing ; that if one were desired to do a thing, 

1 Nieupoort to De Witt, January 14, 1656. 

2 Schlezer to the Great Elector, April 25, 1656. Bordeaux to Brienne, May 29, 1656. 
3 Thurloe sent General Montague (Carte MSS., lxxiii., fol. 13) a most discouraging account 

of Charles Gustavus' affairs, "who will meet with many difficulties more to keep his con- 
quests than he had to make them." The Cossacks and Tartars were on the side of Poland, 
Danzig was disposed to hold out to the last extremity, and a war with the Muscovites appeared 
very likely. " These things make me think that the Swede is like to have a hot summer of it, 
especially if we add to what is said before that the States General are sending 48 ships into the 
Baltic Sea to oppose him also, and are labouring all they can to engage Denmark with them. 
Some of the 48 ships are already sailed, but yet nothing is pretended by them but fairness, and 
to have no intention but to preserve their navigation and commerce; but the Swede knows 
their meaning." There had been rumors of the king's defeat current in England for weeks 
together, which were readily believed. 



CEOMWELL AND CHAELES GUSTAVUS. 43 

if he meant to do it, he would say, yea, aud do it accordingly : but if 
he did not intend to do it, then he would at the first desire to be ex- 
cused, and not seem at one time to be willing to do it, and at another 
time to deny it, * * that he should have been contented if he 
might have had the honour to have laid the foundation of that great 
business for the glory of God, to unite the Protestant interest; and the 
particulars thereof to have been left to a new treaty with the king, 
by an ambassador from the Protector, when there might be full time 
to consider all grounds and circumstances thereof." ] 

At a conference a few days later Whitelocke was commissioned by 
the Protector to visit Bonde and assure him of the sincerity of the 
Protector's attentions. "According to the direction of his Highness," 
he tells us under date of April 7, " I went this morning to the Swed- 
ish ambassador, and delivered to him what I was directed from the 
Protector, as much to his Highness' advantage as I could improve it; 
and endeavoured to satisfy the ambassador that his Highness' inten- 
tions and inclinationsas to a nearer alliance with the king of Sweden 
were the same still as at first, and that he had a very good inclination 
to it, and was really desirous of it. 

"The ambassador answered, ' That perhaps his Highness had no 
great mind at the first to a nearer alliance with the king of Sweden, and 
so might have the same intentions still : That he could not but wonder 
that his Highness should heretofore express himself so well inclined 
to that nearer alliance, and at his last audience to be so cold in it, and 
of another opinion than he was before ; which would make him seem 
to his master either negligent as to his service, or not at all thought 
worthy of regard here ; but he desired to know a certain answer, ay or 
no, whether he would do it or not; and if he had no mind to it, that 
then there might be a dispatch of what was left to be done upon the 
treaty made by me, and so he might kiss the Protector's hand and re- 
turn to his master.' 

" I, seeing him in such a humour of discontent, sought to divert him, 
and to satisfy him that the Protector was still very well inclined to the 
point of a nearer alliance with the king of Sweden, but found it diffi- 
cult to make him of that persuasion ; yet thought it fit to demand of 
him what those propositions were which he delivered to the Protector 

1 Whitelocke's Memorials, 637. 



44 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

concerning the nearer alliance. Whereupon the ambassador showed me 
the propositions he had delivered in to that purpose, which were, ' To 
have a league defensive contra omnes gentes, and offensive as to the 
maintenance of the treaty of Augsburg ; that the Protector should con- 
tribute 200,000/. per annum to that design, when undertaken, and the 
king should have 30,000 foot and 6,000 horse in service upon it.' I 
asked why his excellency put the business upon the maintenance of the 
treaty of Augsburg, whereto England was no party ; and why rather it 
might not be against the house of Austria, whereof the emperor was one 
branch, and the king of Spain another; and said, 'As to the contribut- 
ing of money, he knew the Protector was not in a condition at this 
time to spare money, having such vast occasions of expense at present 
for maintenance of his navy, and by occasion of the war with Spain.' 
The ambassador replied, 'That he did believe the Protector was 
at present in no condition to part with much money, and that there 
would be some time before this design could be set on foot; by which 
time probably the Protector might be better able to spare money than 
now he is ; and that he thought it would be better husbandry for Eng- 
land to spare 200,000/. a year for this war, which would be a good 
diversion, and trouble the king of Spain more than we do by spend- 
ing two millions a year upon our fleets, and in sending to Jamaica. 
That it was true the treaty of Augsburg was not concerning the Eng- 
lish nation, but the Protestants of Germany were highly concerned in 
it, and consequently all Christendom ; and the emperor having broken 
that treaty in many points, there was a just ground thereby of falling 
upon him; and the reason why he mentioned the maintenance of that 
treaty was, because France was already obliged in a treaty with Swe- 
den for the maintenance of the treaty of Augsburg; and England 
joining likewise therein, France would be engaged with them, and that 
crown was a good balance. Whereas, if the union with the king of 
Sweden should be against the house of Austria and the king of Spain, 
it would cause the peace which was so much endeavoured between 
France and Spain to be brought to eifeet; and France would hardly 
be brought into such an union against the house of Austria, because 
it would seem too much against the Papists in general, wherein France 
would be shy to join.' " 

This Swedish proposal and its unfavorable reception mark the last 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 45 

phase of these negotiations which have any interest for us. Though 
they were continued for some months in a desultory manner, it was 
more for the purpose of keeping up appearances before the Dutch, 
than with the expectation of a favorable outcome. The relations be- 
tween England and Sweden had in fact come to this unsatisfactory 
stage, that each party sought to involve the other but to avoid commit- 
ting itself. The fatal objection to the Swedish proposition from the Pro- 
tector's point of view was that it would have been an agreement by 
which Sweden might have attacked Austria, but not one by which it 
must have done so. It would also probably have been construed by 
the Dutch as a menace, and it contained elements foreign to the matter 
in hand. The Protector complained that he did not know what might 
be demanded of him under cover of the treaty of Augsburg. The 
Swedes, on the other hand, complained that Cromwell was trying to 
involve them in a war with Austria to further his own interests, only 
to abandon them to make shift as best they could, when these had 
been secured. Cromwell had refused to grant the subsidies asked for; 
indeed he could not. It was seldom that he was not in want of money, 
but the letters of this date show that it was a time of special embar- 
rassment. He argued, therefore, that as war with Austria was unavoid- 
able for Sweden, the king had an equal interest in it with England 
and should not demand subsidies ; l thus showing that Sweden's fear of 
having to bear the brunt of the struggle was not without foundation. 

A Commercial Treat}/; Bowie's and Coyet's Departure. — While 
these fruitless negotiations concerning a nearer alliance and mutual aid 
had been going on, there had been negotiating, almost independently of 
them, a treaty of commerce, which was brought to a conclusion on 
July 17. It had little political significance and consequently lies out- 
side the scope of this paper; yet it may be well to mention some of 
the matters determined by it. 

The plan to transfer the English trade from Archangel to the Baltic, 2 
though pressed hard by Bonde, finally came to nothing. The English 
merchants feared the Swedish tolls more than the long and perilous 
journey through the Arctic Ocean and refused to make the change. 

The matter of contraband and the closely allied matter of passes were 

1 Pufendorff, iii., \ 78, with the marginal date March 7. 

2 Railing, p. 20, gives some interesting details. 



46 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

the subjects of much contention and of some bitter words. The war 
with Spain was chiefly naval, and the English were determined to cut 
off the naval supplies of the North from their rivals, and to maintain 
a strict search in order that they might not be smuggled under false 
passes. They therefore proposed a list of .contraband articles which, 
Bonde averred, only needed the addition of copper and iron to com- 
prise a complete list of Swedish products. The discussions over this 
point occupy a large part of the pages which Whitelock gives to these 
negotiations. Bonde was forced in the end to give way, though his 
instructions required him to refer the matter to Charles Gustavus for 
ratification. 1 In the matter of passes the Swedes fared somewhat 
better. 

The request of the Swedes for permission to recruit six or eight 
thousand Scotch for the king's service was at first refused 2 until the 
return of the English fleet from the West Indies, after which the 
Protector's affairs would be more settled. Permission was afterwards 
granted, chiefly, it would appear, if not entirely, through Fleetwood's 
influence. The reports are so confused that I cannot discover how 
many men were actually raised. The number must have been large, 
but some of them, at least, did not fulfill what was expected of them. 3 
The Swedes were not in the least grateful for the favor, but regarded 
it as serving Cromwell's own interest, 4 for which view there was at 
least some color. r> 

As to the trading privileges to be granted the English in return for 
aid against the Dutch, of which we hear so much during the first part 
of Bonde's embassy, and so little during the last, I regret that I have 
not been able to discover exactly what concessions were offered. It 
seems to me probable that Bonde spoke in general terms merely, and 
did not descend to particulars. At any rate he made but little im- 
pression on the English, and in the new instructions received on Feb- 

1 Coyet's instructions, § 14. This is why it forms a special article of the treaty. PufendorfT 
gives an abstract of the treaty (iii., \ 81), and also publishes the whole text in the appendix. 
Dumont gives the main part of the treaty, but not the supplementary articles. Tom. vi., part 
ii., p. 125. 

2 Rolts' instructions, par. 6. Thurloe Papers, iii., 418. Thurloe told Nieupoort they were re- 
fused out of consideration for Dutch feelings. 

a "The levies of England which are sent over hither, signify little. They find not things 
answer promise or expectation, which makes them mutiny or run away, to the dishonor of 
our nation." Meadowe to Thurloe, June 29, 1658. Eng. Hist. Review, vii., 737. 

* Pufendorff, ii., §92. 

Charles II. to Lord Leven. Clarendon S. P., 1., fol. 120. 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 47 

ruary 8 he is told not to press the matter further. There is in the 
Public Record office an undated paper containing " propositions in 
order to a treaty with Sweden," ] which probably belongs to this pe- 
riod. It asks for lower custom duties and more freedom in the hand- 
ling and sale of goods. But to English propositions of this kind 
Bonde objected that " the demands were not equal. " 3 All concessions 
were, when it came to definite particulars, found to rest after all on 
strict reciprocity. 

Cromwell's letter to Charles Gustavus on Coyet's departure is dated 
April 17, 1656. 3 On May 3, Coyet received the order of Knight of 
the Garter and a valuable present from Cromwell. 4 Whitelocke men- 
tions him again under date of May 8, 5 but he must have sailed soon 
after. 

Bonde was ready to leave in July, but the presents which the Pro- 
tector intended for him were not ready, so he staid on until Septem- 
ber 3. 6 In his letter of credence, which extols him highly, we read: 
a As for the transactions that yet remain, we have shortly to send your 
majesty a special embassy for those, and meanwhile may God preserve 
your majesty safe, to be a pillar in his Church's defence and in the 
affairs of Sweden." ' 

The failure of Bonde's mission was generally attributed to Nieu- 
poort's influence. 8 This was certainly the proximate reason, but a 
deeper reason was perhaps the divergences between the aims of the two 
rulers, neither of whom was in the habit of making concessions. The 
doubtful state of Charles Gustavus' fortunes and Cromwell's financial 
embarrassment also had undoubted influence. 9 

Fleetwood Remains in London. — After the departure of Coyet and 
Bonde, Swedish interests were left in the hands of Fleetwood, who 

1 S. P., Sweden, 1656. 

2 Whitelocke' s Memorials, 635. 

8 Milton, Literse, 117. 
*Whitelocke's Memorials, 644. 
6 Ibid., 645. 

6 " * * * l'Ambas'r s'est retire apres avoir receu becoup de marques extraordinaires." 
Bordeaux to Brienne, September 11. 
7 Milton, Literse, 125. 
s " Der jetzt a, tout force regieret." Schlezer to Waldeck, June 6, 1656. 

9 "Ceux qui croyent cognoistre l'estat des affaires Domestiques du Protecteur, jugent que ce 
n'est pas le temps de prendre aucune deliberation sur celles de dehors, et moins encore de 
s'engager dans une Alliance qui renouvelle la guerre avec les Provinces-Unies." Bordeaux 
to Brienne, August 23, 1656. 



48 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

kept his character of ambassador secret in order to frequent the court 
with greater freedom. So easily could he do this under cover of his 
family connections that it was not till December that Nieupoort dis- 
covered his real object. 1 There appears to have been no special nego- 
tiations for some time, although the Protector had not abandoned the 
plan of a closer alliance. On June 29, before Bonde's departure, the 
Council voted "that his Highness be reminded of speeding an am- 
bassador into Sweden," 2 and although the Protector's relations with the 
Dutch were already less cordial, 3 the mediation of a peace between 
Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands was still the keystone of his 
policy in the North. 4 On August 21 he wrote to the States General 
earnestly deprecating the disagreement between the United Provinces 
and Sweden, and urging the necessity of union amongst Protestant 
states in opposition to Spain. 5 During this same month he wrote to 
the king of Sweden, and on December 4 to the king of Denmark 6 in 
much the same strain. But on December 1 Nieupoort wrote that he 
heard no more of sending an ambassador to Sweden. The calling of 
Parliament, the war with Spain, attempts to raise money, royalists 
and assassination plots, and the Petition and Advice were sufficient 
to keep the Protector occupied until well into the following year. 
Even as late as July 29, 1657, Nieupoort thought domestic matters 
occupied the Protector's attention more than foreign aifairs. 

Bremen. — But, in the meantime, 7 there had been important though 
fruitless negotiations going on that Nieupoort knew nothing of. Ever 
since the beginning of the Polish war, the king of Denmark had been 
waiting for a favorable opportunity to strike back at his old antagonist. 
As the position of Sweden became more difficult in the spring of 1657, 
the attitude of Denmark grew more threatening, and it was evident 

1 Nieupoort to De Witt, December 1, 1G56. 

2 S. P. Dom., Interreg., lxxvii., fol. 190. 

3 " I like not the carriage of the Hollanders ; our ships of war and theirs scarce ever meet in 
the Channel but they have some scuffle or other." Thurloe to Montague, August 28, 1636. 
Carte MSS., lxxiii., fol. 26. 

4 " Les affaires de Suede et de Pologne le touchent darvantage, et il songe encore a une Union 
estroitte avec eeate Couronne, la France, le Dannemark, et les Estatz-Generaux, eomme a un 
moyon asseure de balancer la puissance de la Maison d'Autriche." Bordeaux to Brienne, No- 
vember 27, 1656. Also Bordeaux to Mazarin, December 4, 1656. 

5 Milton, Literpe, 130, and Thurloe, v., 330, from which the date is taken. The reply of the 
Dutch is annexed, dated September 22. 

6 Milton, Liters, 151, but without the day of the month. The original in the Danish archives 
is dated December 4, 1656 (Macray). 

i Pufendorff gives the marginal date as February 13, for the following negotiations. 



CKOMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 49 

that a rupture might soon be expected. Charles Gustavus was suffer- 
ing chiefly from a lack of money, and turned again to Cromwell for 
aid, asking the loan of £100,000. Cromwell expressed his willingness 
to furnish the money on a sufficient guarantee of repayment, namely, 
the possession of the Bishopric Bremen. Bremen was worth so much 
more than the amount of the proposed loan that the king at first re- 
garded this counter-demand as merely a means of parrying his request. 
Yet this was not the case. Cromwell made the proposal in all ear- 
nestness, and clung to it with great persistency. It was, in fact, too 
much in keeping with his procedure elsewhere for us to doubt his sin- 
cerity in it. He always had a hankering after ports and strong places 
on the Continent, and we have only to take his motives in other cases 
and apply them to the state of affairs in the North to find his motives 

here. 

We have already seen how Cromwell's policy in the North required 
that affairs in that region should not be disturbed. Considerations of 
trade demanded that the control of the Baltic remain divided as it then 
was; the interests of religion demanded that the two northern Protest- 
ant powers direct their arms against the common Catholic enemy, not 
against each other. In trying to secure a foothold in Bremen, Crom- 
well must have had a very definite object. It was directed against some 
one in particular, and who could this be but those who were conspiring 
against the existing peace in the North, a peace upon which his north- 
ern policy, and with it his whole foreign policy, rested? As the pos- 
session of Dunkirk and Mardyke was desired not merely as an inroad 
against the Spanish power, but as a means of bringing pressure to bear 
on France and the Netherlands, 1 so the possession of Bremen must have 
been designed, in part, if not chiefly, to the same end with regard to Den- 
mark. This view is supported by the fact that the Protector was 'at 
the same time on the point of sending an ambassador, Mr. Meadowe, 
to Denmark to persuade Frederick to refrain from his attack on Swe- 
den. 2 His efforts would have much greater prospect of success if they 

i See Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time, or in lieu of this, Concerning Forraigne Af- 
faires in the Protector's Time, Lord Somer's Tracts, vi., 331, for a very lucid and concise ex- 
planation of the Protector's objects in Flanders. 

2 On February 24, 1657, the Council voted that the Protector be recommended to send Meadowe 
to Denmark, and following entries in the Council Order Book show that his immediate depart- 
ure was intended ; but he was held back, for reasons which are not stated, until September 3, 
the day of Jephson's departure. 
4 



50 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

could be supported by the presence of an English force on the Danish 
frontier. 

But of course, as usual, Cromwell may have had more than one 
object. The German Protestants would be encouraged by the presence 
of an English force, and this influence in Germany could be used in 
various ways, among others, it may be, to the advantage of English 
trade. 1 " Being now on the continent, and considered as the patron of 
the Protestant interest, he stood fair for the undertaking and prose- 
cuting any design, to which the vicissitude of human affairs might 
give him opportunity." 2 Finally, he was justified in demanding a 
secure military base of operations for so distant an undertaking. 3 In 
short, it seems that we may accept Cromwell's own explanation of his 
chief objects, when he told Charles Gustavus that English possession 
of Bremen would keep the Dutch and Danes quiet and encourage the 
Protestants, while the king would be free to make better use of its 
garrisons elsewhere. 4 

But the reason why Cromwell wanted Bremen was the very reason 
why Charles Gustavus could not surrender it. He, too, wanted a com- 
manding position over Denmark, but for a different reason. Cromwell 
had every interest in preserving peace. Charles Gustavus wanted war. 
He was tired of his Polish adventures, with their unsubstantial gains 
but very substantial ills. Denmark offered a field for something more 
than barren victories ; to surrender Bremen on the eve of the struggle 
was not to be thought of. 5 He, therefore, urged various excuses, 

1 One infers this latter more from the prevailing commercial ideas of the time and Crom- 
well's constant efforts to extend English trade, than from any definite evidence which our 
sources offer. It may be urged against this view, that the English occupation of Bremen was 
intended to be only temporary (Jephson's instructions, par. 8) unless, indeed, it can beshowu 
that Cromwell thought the Swedes would not be in a position to redeem it. Yet the position 
of Bremen, controlling alike the Elbe and the Weser, was exceedingly favorable to such plans. 

2 Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time, referring to the possession of Dunkirk, etc. 

3 Jephson's instructions, par. 6. Thurloe Papers, vi., 478. 

4 "Addebantur rationes : cam nimium a Svecia remotam; ac posse Regem milite prtesidiario 
alibi uti : idque Belgarum destinata valde turbatururn, Danoque scrupulum injecturum metu 
irruptionis in Jutiam : denique pnesentia Anglorum Protestantibus animos additum iri ad 
Pontiflciis eo acrius resistendum." Pufendorff, iv., I 79. 

& The importance of the Swedish possession of Bremen as an opening into Denmark was 
well understood at that time. " By which the Swede * * * has betwixt his ancient patri- 
mony on the one side, and his new acquisitions on the other, as it were enclosed and belea- 
guered Denmark." Meadowe's Narrative, p. 2. "* * * bet Stift Bremen, het welche soo is 
gelegen, dat het seer considerable is voor den Koningh van Denemarcken, die daer door, ende 
door het geene hy was genooksaekt gewest aen Sweden in te ruymen door het gemelde 
Tractaet, als tusschen den haemer ende het aenbeeldt was geklemt geweest." Nieupoort 
to De Witt, July 29, 1657. The significance of Charles Gustavus' marriage with the daughter 
of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp must not be forgotten in this connection. 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 51 

among others the real one, and was inclined for a time not to press the 
matter further. 

Yet since Cromwell appeared bent on getting a footing in Germany, 
it might be possible to come to an agreement with him at the expense 
of someone else. Would he not take forcible possession of Emden 
and East Friesland, or Oldenburg ; or, if he considered this too diffi- 
cult, would he not be content with building a fort on the River Stor, 
and taking possession of the surrounding country? He would then 
have no need of Bremen, which on account of its supplies of money 
and of troops, and its nearness to Denmark, the king could ill spare. 
It is not surprising that these proposals made no impression on the 
Protector. It was one thing to take peaceful possession of a province 
for furthering a definite object. It was quite another thing to turn 
freebooter and begin a war of wanton aggression against powers, with 
one at least of whom he was on terms of close friendship. 1 The 
propositions were therefore declined. 

Meadowe's and Jephson's Mediation. — The relations between Eng- 
land and Sweden became more distant for a time, 2 yet events soon 
tended to draw them together again. In spite of the constitutional 
struggles in which Cromwell was involved, he found time to come to 
an agreement with Mazarin for the invasion of the Spanish Nether- 
lands. Three days later the emperor of Germany died, opening a 
new opportunity for hostile action against the house of Hapsburg. 
Both Cromwell and Charles Gustavus were extremely interested in 
bringing the imperial crown into other hands, 3 and were prepared to 
second France in its efforts to accomplish this end, although it must be 
confessed that neither of them was in a position to make his influence 
very much felt in the matter. But the deciding factor in uniting 

1 Various passages in Masson give us glimpses of Cromwell's relations with the Count of Old- 
enburg. As early as the middle of 1651, before the battle of Worcester, we find an envoy from 
the latter in London for the purpose of establishing a good understanding with the Common- 
wealth. Their relations were throughout most cordial, and in 1654 Count Frederick's son, 
Count Antony, visited England. It was with a team of spirited horses sent as a present from 
the count that the well known runaway incident in Hyde Park occurred. 

- P.edenken des Schwedischen Senats liber die Frage : Ob sich Konig Carl Gustav in Schwe- 
den mit Frankreich und Engelland in ein Bundniss wider das Haus Oesterreich einlassen solle? 
dt anno 1057. Lunig, Staats-Concilia, ii., 593. The Council thought it better to await the de- 
velopment of the plans of Austria. 

:i Lunig, Staats-Concilia, ii., 592. Carlson, iv., 192, Anm. Urk. u. Actenst, vii., 766. Both 
suggested the Elector of Brandenburg as a possible candidate. There is an anonymous manu- 
script in the British Museum (Add. 32093, fol. 397) advocating England's interference, chiefly 
on religious grounds. 



52 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

Cromwell and Charles Gustavus was the outbreak of the Danish war, 
closely followed by the formation of a new alliance between Poland 
and Austria. Cromwell informed Charles Gustavus that if the Dutch 
appeared to be supporting the Danes in this matter he would take 
other counsels, 1 and he pressed again for possession of Bremen. The 
Danes would hardly have ventured in their present course, he said, if 
his former proposals had been accepted. He even reduced his demand 
to the possession of Stade as a basis for military operations; but even 
this Charles Gustavus was unwilling to grant. The king could only 
bring himself to offer the strongholds of the Dutchy Verden, although 
he might have foreseen that the possession of inland forts with no pos- 
sibility of relieving them by sea in case of siege, 2 would be the last 
proposal that Cromwell would accept. The negotiations had in fact 
again degenerated into mere bargaining, and as usual Cromwell deter- 
mined to treat through his own envoys. Philip Meadowe had long 
been intended as ambassador to Denmark, and now Maj.-Gen. Wm. 
Jephson was named for a similar mission to the king of Sweden. 

The objects of Meadowe's mission are given in a paper entitled : 
" Propositio legati protectoris Anglia3 ad regem Daniaj," which was 
recently discovered by Dr. Joseph Weiss, and published in Historisches 
Jahrbuch (vol. xiv., p. 608). Meadowe has incorporated the contents 
of this paper into his Narrative in the following words : " England 
had too great an interest in the Baltic (the Mediterranean of the 
North) to sit still without making reflection upon those commotions in 
the northern kingdoms. For besides the general concerns of a free 
trade, which must of necessity have suffered interruption by the con- 
tinuance of this war, England being at that time engaged in a war 
with one branch of the Austrian family, viz., with Spain, would rather 
the Swedish arms had been at liberty to give check to the other 
branch in Germany as occasion might offer, than to be diverted there- 
from by a war with Denmark. * * * His [Meadowe's] business 
was to remonstrate how unwelcome it was to them in England to un- 
derstand of a rupture betwixt the two crowns, albeit they esteemed 
the communication thereof by the letters and manifest 3 of that king 
as an expression of friendship. That besides the effusion of Christian 

i Puf., iv., I 79. Urk. u. Actenst, vii., 762. 
'-' Jephson's instructions, par. 9. 
3 Jus feciale armatse Danise. 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 53 

blood betwixt two nations linked together by the common bonds of 
nature and religion, and both of them leagued in amity with England, 
the continuation of that war might in so perilous a juncture consider- 
ably endanger the whole Protestant cause and interest ; and nothing- 
could have happened more advantageous to Spain, with whom Eng- 
land was in open hostility. Besides, his majesty of Denmark could 
not but be sensible how much the freedom of navigation and commerce 
in the Baltic would be impeached thereby, to the prejudice of the 
neighboring nations, but of none more than England, as continually 
fetching; naval stores from those countries. He was therefore sent 
on the part of England to that king to offer the best and most 
friendly offices for the accommodating all differences betwixt the two 
crowns, and putting a stop to so unhappy a war, and to assure him 
that they would employ their utmost interest with the king of Sweden 
to dispose him thereto, and to that purpose had already sent a gentle- 
man to him." 1 From subsequent negotiations, it appears that Crom- 
well intended to make the treaty of Bromsebro the basis of the new 
peace. 

Jephson's secret instructions 2 are dated August 22, 1657. They 
recite that the former negotiations with Bonde had come to nothing 
because Bonde was not authorized to agree upon "the terms of that 
assistance" which had been asked for, nor to place at the Protector's 
disposal any " places of safe retreat for his men, or secure harbours for 
his ships." "Furthermore, this assistance being desired by the king, 
and wholly upon the account of his interest, the expense and charge of 
such an undertaking is to be considered, if not in present, yet here- 
after, when it shall please God to put his majesty's affairs into a more 
peaceable condition." If, now, his majesty is willing to place Bremen 
at the Protector's disposal for this purpose, the Protector will send 
forces to take possession of it, and will agree to surrender it again "at 
any time upon demand of the crown of Sweden, being first paid the 
charges we shall be at over and above what shall be levied upon the 
country, in and about the keeping and securing the said dukedom." 
These instructions have on the face of them a somewhat different as- 

1 Meadowe's Narrative, p. 16, seq. 

2 Printed in Thurloe Papers, vi., 478. The original manuscript, in the handwriting of Thurloe, 
with many erasures and corrections, evidently the first draft, is in the British Museum. Add. 
MSS. 4157, fol. 201. 



54 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

pect than the foregoing, but in reality they are quite in keeping with 
it. For if the king had acceded to this demand, Cromwell would have 
been master of the situation, and could have mediated, as it were with 
sword in hand, and with some prospect of success. Yet he appears 
to have been not very confident that the proposal would be accepted, 
for Jephson was told not to mention the matter "unless his majesty 
should administer the occasion thereof, and express himself inclined 
to put it into our hands." 

After some difficulty in ascertaining the whereabouts of the two 
kings, Meadowe and Jephson were received at Copenhagen and Wis- 
mar respectively with special marks of honor, and both kings signified 
their readiness to accept the Protector's mediation. But in the course 
of the proposals and counter-proposals which were exchanged during 
the succeeding months, 1 it soon became evident that neither party was 
willing to make the necessary concessions. Certain details could not 
be adjusted, because certain vital matters of policy were involved in 
them. The place of meeting for the commissioners presented the first 
difficulty. The king of Denmark proposed Lubeck as a convenient and 
neutral place, trusting to have the presence and support of his Polish 
and Austrian allies. The king of Sweden proposed some place on the 
inaccessible frontier of Denmark and Sweden, according to ancient 
custom and the treaty of Bromsebro, in order that the ambassadors 
of the allies of Denmark could not with any convenience attend, and 
he might thus sow jealousy and dissension among his enemies through 
a separate treaty. From this arose another dispute. The mediation 
had been offered between Sweden and Denmark alone, but in his dec- 
laration of November 3 the king of Denmark demanded that Poland 
and Brandenburg be included. Much anxiety was caused in English 
councils by this new demand and Denmark's cause was prejudiced not 
a little by it; but Denmark appeared bound by treaty not to make a 
separate peace. Charles Gustavus was willing to grant the ambassa- 
dors of the allies licenses to be present as spectators, but not as confed- 
erates and principals, and on this point no agreement could be reached. 
To these came a third difficulty. Charles Gustavus had proposed that 
the good officers of France be joined with those of England in the 

1 Meadowe's account of these, Narrative, p. 19, scq., is very concise and clear. See, also, 
Meadowe's and Jephson's dispatches in Thurloe Papers, Pufendorff, iv., § 77, Diariuni Euro- 
paeum, etc. 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 55 

mediation. Denmark proposed in return the inclusion of the States 
General also. This Charles Gustavus would admit on one condition, 
that they first ratify the treaty of Elbing. But Denmark insisted 
that they be included without waiting for the ratification. So bitter 
was the feeling on this point that when Dutch ambassadors arrived at 
the court of Charles Gustavus he at first refused them audience, hoping, 
as Jephson thought, to drive the Dutch to espouse openly the cause of 
the Danes, which would force the Protector against his will to the side 
of Sweden. In short, the attempt at mediation failed utterly, because 
neither party desired it. Neither the king of Sweden was deterred by 
the formidable combination of his enemies, nor the king of Denmark 
by the loss of Jutland, and each hoped for a favorable turn of fortune. 
"Mediating princes are most welcome and successful when the parties 
are wearied with the war, as those physicians are most happy who 
come. in the declension of a disease." 1 

Friesendrojfs Instructions. — At about the time of Meadowe's and 
Jephson's departure, a Swedish ambassador, J. F. von Friesendorff, 
arrived in England with instructions of a remarkable character, which 
for disregard of the accepted rules of political morality can hardly be 
matched among the papers of the time. They reveal a characteristic 
trait of the foreign policy of this prince, who, with all his attractive 
personal qualities, cannot be acquitted of violence and lawlessness in 
his relations with his neighbors. 

If Cromwell's hesitancy in engaging in the northern war could be 
overcome by offers of territorial acquisition on the Baltic, then surely 
there need be no difficulty. Friesendortf 's secret instructions 2 con- 
tained an elaborate system of proposals and alternatives for the Eng- 
lish occupation of various portions of German and Danish territory 
in order to induce Cromwell to finally lend efficient aid to Swedish 

1 Meadowe, A View of the Suedish and other Affairs, p. 175. 

2 They have been printed by Treschow in Nye Danske Magazin, Tredje Bind (1810), p. 73, 
from a copy in the Danish archives. Pufendorff gives a fairly complete abstract of them (lib. 
iv., § 82). " In irgend einer Weise riel den Danen die Instruction in die Hande, und diese beeil- 
ten sich, siein Berlin mitzutheilen ; der Kurfiirst wiederum theilte sie, wahrend der Friedens- 
verhandlungen in Oliva, dem kaiserlichen Hofe mit (dat. 23. Marz 1660); so dass also diese 
schwedisch-englischen Geheimnisse sehr bald in weiten Kreisen bekannt waren. tfbrigens 
cursirten Geruchte uber solche schwedisch-englische Abmachungen schon in September 1656 
auf dem Reichsdeputationstag in Frankfurt ; s. Urk. u. Actenst., vii., 677." Erdmannsdorffer, 
Deutsche Geschichte, i., 285, Anm. 2. " Le diet Sr. Secretaire d'Estat commenca par me desad- 
vouer que les Ministres de Suede eussent fait aucunes offres, soit de Glowstadt ou d'aucune 
autre Place." Bordeaux to Mazarin, March 5, 1658. 



56 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

arms. The proposals were as follows : For the first part, Cromwell 
should unite his forces with those of Sweden against Denmark until 
the latter had been brought to a position in which it was no longer to 
be feared " and the freedom of commerce and free passage through the 
Sound was restore^ to all nations." In order that the balance of 
power in the Sound might be maintained, it was proposed that Sweden 
resume possession of its ancient provinces, Schonen, Blecking, and 
Halland, together with Christina and the provinces Bonus and Drunt- 
heim as protection against Danish invasion, 1 and finally that the 
County Pinneberg, and the Kremper and Wilster Marches, which had 
formerly belonged to Bremen, should be restored to it. 

As soon, now, as they had without difficulty set their house in or- 
der (for surely Cromwell, too, had as much to fear from Denmark and 
Holland as from Spain and Austria), Charles Gustavus proposed to 
accede to Cromwell's long-cherished desire for a common attack against 
the house of Hapsburg, and in addition to make certain other con- 
cessions which would serve not only the public interests of England, 
but Cromwell's private interests as well. First, the king agreed to 
assist in the conquest of Delmenhorst and Oldenburg (his claims to 
the former he abandoned in Cromwell's favor), which Cromwell should 
" hold as his own" ; and that Cromwell should be free to take posses- 
sion of East Friesland, the Bishopric Munster, and as much of the 
Westphalian Circle as he was able to, as quarter for his troops, which 
advantage Charles Gustavus proposed to share also with the greater 
part of his army. The possession of these provinces would lend Crom- 
well a support in his private ambition in establishing the power of his 
house such as England did not offer, and would give him the oppor- 
tunity of attacking at his pleasure either the Danes, the Dutch, or the 
house of Hapsburg. Various pretexts for the proposed violence were 
suggested, as well as methods for satisfying the injured princes. If, 
however, this was not sufficient, and Cromwell desired a position by 
which he could bring Poland and Danzig to account for past injuries, 
and in conjunction with Sweden, attack Austria from the side of 
Silesia, 2 the fortification Weichselmunde near Danzig could be given 

1 Bohus and Druntheim were then being used by the Danes as bases for military operations 
against Sweden. 

2 Droysen's statement (Geschichte d. Preussische Politik, iii., 2, 250, 2d ed.), that Silesia was 
offered to Cromwell by Charles Gustavus, probably rests upon a misunderstanding of this 
phrase. Erdmannsdorffer, Deutsche Geschichte, i., 285, Anm. 1. 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 57 

him, together with a part of Pommerellen. Charles Gustavus would 
also assist in the taking of Putzke. 

All these advantages were offered the Protector in order to grant 
him a foothold in Germany and to persuade him to engage in the com- 
mon struggle. Yet Charles Gustavus would prefer if instead of this 
he would take part in the conquest and partition of Denmark. In this 
case his share would be North Jutland, with the port Listerdiep and 
the neighboring islands, which would be more advantageous in sup- 
porting the English fleet than the proposed parts of Germany. From 
this, however, the king excepted the districts Koldingen and Horsens, 
or in lieu of the latter, Ripen, which, with the remainder of Jutland, 
and Schleswig, Holstein, and Fiinen, would be given to his father-in- 
law, the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, under Swedish and English guar- 
antee. The three districts, Pinneburg, Wilster, and Kremper were, 
however, to be detached from Holstein and reunited with Bremen. 
As for the rest of the Danish dominions, they were to be at the abso- 
lute disposal of Charles Gustavus, to be granted to whatever person 
he chose, or to be divided into small portions " as might best serve the 
common interest." 

The list of alternatives was, however, not yet exhausted. If Crom- 
well demanded Ditmarch, with Kremper, Wilster, and the islands 
about Listerdiep instead of Olden berg and Delmenhorst, this, too, 
could be allowed him, together with Gliickstadt; but in this case he 
must resign his plans on the Weser. Yet, finally, if it appeared that 
the only means to engage his assistance was to give him a foothold on 
both the Elbe and Weser, Friesendorff was authorized to grant this 
also ; but the king depended upon his dexterity to avoid such extreme 
concessions unless they proved unavoidable. 

It was realized that such proposals were of a nature to awaken 
grave suspicions on Cromwell's part, and Friesendorff was therefore 
instructed to emphasize the fact that Charles Gustavus did not intend 
to assume the crown of Denmark himself, but only to transfer it to 
some friend, as the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. In addition, the Eng- 
lish would secure free passage through the Sound and certain privileges 
over all other foreigners in the lands and ports belonging to Sweden. 
Finally, Charles Gustavus was prepared to surrender his claims to 
Prussia in favor of some Protestant prince, as the elector of Bran- 



58 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

denburg, although in this case it was only just that a compensation be 
given Charles Gustavus for his sacrifices in the Polish war. The 
equivalent proposed was the recognition on the part of Poland of 
Swedish sovereignty over Liefland and Courland and the payment of 
a large sum of money, and the cession on Brandenburg's part of 
Hinterpommerania, with something more. 1 

If, however, the Protector could not be moved by any means to take 
part in the conquest and partition of Denmark, Friesendorif must fall 
back on the old proposition of an alliance against Austria. If this 
were refused, the king would be forced to come to terms with them 
and the Dutch, to the detriment of Protestant interests in all parts of 
the world. At the very least, the Protector must take it upon him to 
hold the Dutch in check, and to this purpose send a fleet into the 
Baltic in case they made any signs of espousing the cause of Denmark. 
But yet, if the relations of England and Holland were such that there 
was no prospect of this, Holland could, "for the sake of the common 
interest of the Protestant religion," be tolerated in the general alliance 
which paragraph 11 of Friesendorif 's instructions authorized him to 
propose. 

Friesendorif 's first eiforts were to be directed against Denmark, and 
in order to further this, secondly, against Austria. Paragraph 11 of 
the instructions contains the details of a proposed alliance between 
Sweden, England, France, and Portugal, also Holland it might be, 
against the house of Hapsburg and its allies. To prevent confusion 
and disputes, a council of the members of the alliance would be formed 
to decide upon matters which should arise. Each member must 
furnish his appropriate quota of ships, which, however, were to be 
placed under a single command, Cromwell being encouraged to believe 
that he would be chosen. If France and Portugal desired it, the op- 
erations on land could be continued as they then were, England to take 
position in Germany as proposed, and Sweden to act as a reserve, to 
be supported with subsidies in case its forces were brought into action. 
Finally, the proposed league must devise and execute means for de- 
priving the house of Hapsburg of the imperial crown. 

Friesendorif was ordered to sound the Protector privately before 

1 He had already broached this to the Elector of Brandenburg. Carlson, iv., 242 and 244, 
Anm. 2. 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 59 

making his mission publicly known, and if he found the Protector un- 
favorably inclined, to pretend that he was on his way to Portugal, and 
had only been accidentally delayed in England. This he should do 
until the development of aifairs made further "dissimulation" unnec- 
essary. The instructions were dated at Wedell on the Elbe, August 
3, 1657. 

I regret that I have not been able to discover exactly how Cromwell 
received these proposals. There were some parts of them well calcu- 
lated to enlist his support. If only the matter wit 1 L-o^mark could 
be patched up and the Dutch pacified, the great Protestant alliance 
would seem to be on the point of being realized. It might be possible 
to reconcile Charles Gustavus' proposals with those for an alliance 
between England, Holland, and France, which the Dutch were then 
pressing. There is no evidence, however, that I can find, that he ever 
seriously entertained Charles Gustavus' proposals for dividing Ger- 
many and Denmark. That these proposals did not coincide in the 
least with his northern policy in general is, I think, sufficiently clear. 
What would have become of the Protestant alliance? What would 
the Dutch have had to say, and what assistance might they not have 
given Charles II. ? Besides, subsequent events showed that Cromwell 
had no desire to reduce Denmark to a " position in which it need no 
longer be feared." The proposals, in short, quite apart from all moral 
considerations, would .have involved a radical change in England's 
foreign relations such as a clear-sighted statesman like Cromwell 
would not lightly undertake. There is a tendency among historians 
who have touched upon this episode to link Cromwell's name with 
that of Charles Gustavus in the tacit reproach with which it must be 
regarded; but until it has been shown that Cromwell actually enter-, 
tained the plan for a time, this would seem to be an injustice to him. 
Course of the Negotiations} — The course of the ensuing negotiations 

1 Pufendorff, iv., gg 84 and 85. The documents for the succeeding pages are so scanty that it 
is difficult even to keep up the appearance of a connected narrative. We have mere frag- 
ments, which we can sometimes piece together, sometimes not. From English sources alone 
one would hardly know of the existence of Friesendorff; for in the few cases in which his 
name is mentioned, it is usually misspelled. There is nothing corresponding to Bonde's diary 
to give one a thread, however slight, to string fragments together upon. Whitelocke gives us* 
no information. The dispatches of the foreign ambassadors, even of Nieupoort, are of little 
aid. Even Pufendorff, who is often our only guide, seems to me less lucid. He evidently bases 
his narrative on the letters of the Swedish ambassadors, who appear to have worked largely 
in the dark. An examination of the Swedish archives would no doubt bring new material to 
light, but as is the case with so many of Cromwell's foreign enterprises, it is probable that 
much will never be known. 



60 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

was not such as the Swedish ambassadors desired. Cromwell showed 
Fleetwood and Friesendorff every attention and, as usual, asked for a 
few days for deliberation. Then followed those delays and excuses 
which characterized all Cromwell's negotiations, and which ambassa- 
dors at his court continually complained of. The Swedish ambassa- 
dors found it impossible to discover the Protector's real motives. 
Though English sympathy had been at first decidedly against Den- 
mark as the aggressive party, they found this to a certain extent 
changed. Charles Gustavus' military successes had in fact prejudiced 
his diplomatic prospects. Following their instructions, the ambas- 
sadors proposed an offensive and defensive league against Austria, 
Spain, Poland, and Denmark and whoever might join them, in which 
Cromwell was asked to send a fleet into the Baltic, to continue his 
efforts in Flanders, to contribute subsidies, and in the meantime, 
before all the details could be agreed upon, to send immediate relief to 
Gothenburg, which was blockaded by a small Danish fleet. Cromwell 
complained that this was asking too much of him, but, as usual, prom- 
ised to consider the matter. He appears to have had definite reasons 
for hesitating, 1 but what they were, unless it was waiting for the result 
of Meadowe's and Jephson's mission, or inability to find a clear thread 
in the tangled skein, is not clear. In order to whet his lagging en- 
thusiasm, Charles Gustavus sent another proposal. In return for 
£200,000, 2 he was ready to surrender Buxtenhude and the fort on the 
Leber as security. What reception this proposal met with I cannot 
discover. 

For a long time the relations between England and the Netherlands 
had been growing less satisfactory. The "marine treaty," the object 
.of unremitted efforts on the part of the Dutch since the close of the 
war in 1654, had not yet been brought to a conclusion, much to Nieu- 
poort's chagrin. On the other hand, not only did England suspect the 
Netherlands of having instigated Denmark's hostility, but had grounds 
for believing that the Dutch equipments then in progress were in- 
tended to act in conjunction with Spanish forces against Portugal. 
The Protector did not conceal these suspicions. 

De Witt adopted a policy similar to the one which had succeeded so 

1 Jephson to Thurloe. Thurloe Papers, vi. , 604 and 629. 

2 Carlson says £400,000, iv., 242. 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 61 

well a few months before. He suggested a defensive treaty, this time 
not between England, the United Provinces and Denmark, but between 
England, the United Provinces and France. 1 The idea was welcomed 
by the Protector, though not quite so warmly as the former one had 
been. It had some promise of the great alliance in it, which the Pro- 
tector had by no means yet abandoned. Still, the relations between 
the two powers were somewhat strained, and Nieupoort did not for the 
time being share the Protector's full confidence. 

About the beginning of October, it seemed as if Cromwell, moved 
by the critical condition of Swedish affairs, had decided that some 
show of armed interference was necessary. Under date of October 
9, 2 Fleetwood and Friesendorff inform the king " in hochster eyl," 
that through the grace of God and their unflagging industry they had 
at last brought the Protector to a certain resolution. He had decided 
to come to the king's assistance and to form a close alliance with him 
against Austria and its allies (for reasons of state, and to appease the 
prejudices of the English people, he must call the child by that name), 
and commissioners would be appointed to confer with the Swedish 
ambassadors concerning the matter. He desired only a week's delay 
to equip a fleet and to put his affairs in order ; an envoy would be 
sent to Holland to warn the Dutch against the course they were pur- 
suing. He had not taken this course before from lack of money ; but 
he thought he now had good prospects of removing this difficulty. 

Already, on October 3, Cromwell had issued a warrant for the 
equipment of a fleet. It was to consist of twenty ships, to be ready 
in fourteen days at farthest, and to be furnished with at least three 
months' provisions. 3 "The design for the ships," wrote Thurloe, 4 "is 
to give countenance to Sweden, whose affairs are in a dangerous condi- 
tion, being left alone in the midst of very many powerful enemies, [the] 
Pole, the king of Hungary and [the] Muscovite and the Dane, and 
fears also the Hollander, who gives money and if need be will send 

1 Nieupoort's and De Witt's letters of May 4 and following, though without the authority of 
the States General. It was as first a suggestion merely, not a formal proposal. 

2 The letter is printed in Handlingar rorande Skandinaviens Historia, v., 205-213. 

3 Carte MSS., lxxiii, fol. 132. The names of the vessels, their rates and the number of seamen 
are given, aggregating 810 guns and 4,020 men. 

* Carte MSS., lxxiii., fol. 138. Thurloe to Montague, October 9, 1657. Holograph, chiefly in 
cipher, imperfectly deciphered, and hard to read. It is printed, with some changes, in Thurloe 
Papers, vi., 582, under the heading, " Draught of a letter concerning Swedish affairs, to Gen- 
eral Montague." 



62 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

the Dane the ships [eighteen in number] which were appointed to lie 
upon the Dogger Bank. The ministers of Sweden are of opinion that 
if ships [were] sent that way to wait upon the motions of [the] Hol- 
landers, though no act of enmity past, it would keep the Hollander 
from him. And for this purpose and no other are these ships pre- 
pared. * * * This is under absolute secrecy and is not to be 
communicated to any." 

The tone of this letter contrasts strangely with the boyish precipi- 
tation of Fleetwood and Friesendorff 's letter to Charles Gustavus, 
while their contents would hardly allow us to believe that they referred 
to the same matter. But the cautious and diplomatic Thurloe is a safe 
guide in matters of this sort (Cromwell in his enthusiasm often said 
too much) and it is probable that there was not very much behind this 
incident which raised Swedish hopes so high. At any rate, when the 
Dutch did not send their fleet into the Sound, the English refrained 
from further demonstration. It must not be forgotten that Cromwell 
was actuated at this time by other considerations than relations in the 
North. His struggle against Spain and the house of Hapsburg was 
still the chief point of his foreign relations, 1 and his whole aim in the 
North was to bring aifairs in this part in accord with this great issue. 
It is significant, therefore, that the only remonstrance which was made 
to Nieupoort in connection with this incident was against Holland's 
negotiation with Spain and its hostility towards Portugal. 2 The affairs 
of Sweden were not mentioned. When the Dutch did not send their 
fleet to the Baltic, as was expected, but called it quietly home, the 
Protector on his part was willing to let the matter drop. To have 
acted otherwise would have transferred the center of his foreign policy 
from Spain to the North. 

But the Protector had expressed himself so unreservedly to Fleet- 
wood and Friesendorff that he felt it necessary to propose terms for a 
treaty, although he did so only after what seemed to the Swedes an inex- 
cusably long delay, and in terms very different from those they thought 
themselves justified in expecting. He proposed an offensive and de- 
fensive alliance against "the kings of Spain, Hungary, and Poland 

1 " The Protector in all these cases governs himself by the Protestant cause." wrote Thurloe 
on October 2, " and he thinks a peace between the two northern crowns is best for that, if it may 
be had." Thurloe Papers, vi., 547. 

2 Nieupoort to De Witt, November 12. 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 63 

and the house of Austria," which France, the Netherlands, and 
others were to be invited to join. The king of Sweden must make 
an attack on Austria, strengthened by troops furnished by the allies, 
but maintained at his own expense. The Protector would wage war 
at sea against Spain, to which purpose the king must agree to furnish 
naval material in such quantities and at such rates as might be agreed 
upon in the articles of the treaty. Cromwell bound himself to send 
a fleet into the Baltic if it were necessary. The allies would be asked 
to contribute money. 1 

But this proposal, it will be noticed, looked entirely away from the 
complications in the North and contained no reference to them. It 
was merely a plan of action for the following summer, and coolly 
avoided the pressing issue then at hand. The Swedes complained 
bitterly. Even the English felt guilty. Thurloe wrote apologetically 
to Jephson on December 18, "If the king be disposed to the same 
thing, you may take occasion to tell him that this is but an essay and 
is intended only as a foundation to begin upon, and if he please to 
declare himself for the general good you are authorized and charged 
to perfect it with him." 2 So loud were Friesendorff's protestations 
that the Protector promised in an evil hour to furnish the king with 
£30,000, with a prospect of more if he could raise it. 3 

The Swedes submitted with an ill grace. Yet what must have been 
their indignation when even this promise was not kept. " I have had 
many discourses with Mons. Frohendorf [Friesendorff], one of his 
ministers here," wrote Thurloe to Jephson, " whom I find a very ready 
man, but am somewhat doubtful how he represents things to his mas- 
ter. I fear the worst. I informed you by my former letter that H. 
H. had promised £30,000 by monthly payments; one month is past 

1 Pufendorff, iv., § 84. These proposals, so far as they are given by Pufendorff, are the same 
as those contained in the paper " Heads of a treaty, to be made with the king of Sweden, for 
a nearer union, etc.," printed in Thurloe Papers, vii., 23, under the date of March 25, 1658, and 
they would appear to be practically if not absolutely identical. This would suggest the possi- 
bility of error in the date of the printed paper, else the English were making the same pro- 
posals after the treaty of Roeskilde as before, which, however, is by no means impossible. But 
I cannot verify this point, as it is not known where the original paper is preserved. Mr. Gar- 
diner tells me he thinks it is in private possession. I am not in a position to say whether the 
paper printed in Lunig's Staats-Concilia, ii., 613, "Bedenken Konig Carl Gustavs in Schweden 
liber das Formular des ihrue von England offerirten Bundnisses, de Anno 1658," complaining 
of the unreasonable trading privileges demanded by the English, refers to these proposals or 
to some others of which I have found no further account. 

2 English Historical Review, vii., 727. 

3 Pufendorff, iv., § 84, with the marginal date November 9. 



64 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

and none paid, which he speaks so freely of, and of the great disap- 
pointment his master's affairs are put under thereby, that truly his 
expressions are hardly borne." 1 He explains that the reason for the 
non-payment was that a part of the fleet had come in unexpectedly 
and large sums were necessary to pay the men, who would otherwise 
mutiny. 2 The Protector was in fact struggling to keep his head above 
water by means of small loans, and the payment of the promised sub- 
sidy was utterly impossible. 

It was not likely that the Protector's efforts to come to an agree- 
ment on the basis of an unkept promise, and without first settling the 
Danish matter, would be of much avail. His efforts to negotiate 
through Jephson instead of with Fleetwood and Friesendorff had from 
the first met with little success. The king was waiting for the result 
of his proposals in London, Jephson thought. Now the matter of the 
promised subsidy presented a new hinderance. Both Jephson, and 
afterwards Meadowe, constantly urged its payment. " I do confess," 
wrote Jephson February 12, 1658, "I could wish the money had 
either never been promised, or paid at the time appointed. * * * 
I have much reason to believe that this is the only cause why they 
proceed not with me in the treaty." 

Gothenburg and Fredericia; the Partition of Denmark Again. — In 

1 English Historical Review, vii., 727. Friesendorff was the only one of the Swedish ambas- 
sadors who aroused the least ill-will in London. All the others appear to have been excep- 
tionally popular, even though their northern vigor did occasionally get the better of their cour- 
tesy. This letter to Jephson contains the following ugly passage, which shows how much 
personal bitterness had entered into the negotiations : "This long story I have told you to pre- 
vent any misrepresentation formed by Monsr. Frohendorf, who I fear is yet enough for 

these things, and I hear labours to disgrace my Ld. G. Fleetwood with the king, which I should 
much desire might be prevented by you. If you can perceive anything of the kind the [re], it 
will be a great disservice to the king's affairs if anything of the kind should be, for whatever 

Monsr. Frohendorf apprehends he is beholden to him for all the ? he hath, and you know 

the interest the Lord Deputy hath in the state and if he should [? see his hoorn put out by 
other] I believe Monsr. Frohendorp would soon find himself disabled ever to do the least thing 
here in any of his affairs. The truth is, had it not been [for] my Lord G., who solicited coun- 
cil here, there never had been a man obtained hence out of the old (?)." It would thus 

seem to be an error for Pufendorff to accredit these negotiations entirely to Friesendorff. It 
will be noticed that in documents and letters signed by Fleetwood and Friesendorff, the name 
of the former comes first, indicating, I take it, precedence in rank as ambassador. Fleetwood 
appears not only to have played the chief part in these negotiations, but also a very important 
part in the preceding ones. His family connections gave him great advantages over the other 
ambassadors, who besides must have found the language a serious drawback in a court which 
did not speak Latin. Jephson mentioned this accusation against Friesendorff to Charles Gus- 
tavus only to be assured that it had no foundation in fact. Thurloe Papers, vi., 72S. 

2 This was not a feigned excuse. Sir Christopher Pack loaned the government £4,000 to pay 
the wages of the fleet. Die. Nat. Biog. Also some others advanced money. C'al. S. P. Dom. , 
May 11, 1658. 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 65 

our sketch of the negotiations in London, we have been carried past a 
striking diplomatic incident of which, unfortunately, we have but the 
merest hint. Jephson had throughout shown much partiality towards 
Charles Gustavus. He was convinced that he sincerely desired peace, 
but doubted whether Denmark did. He thought nothing would so 
soon incline Denmark to it as " a strict and speedy conjunction between 
England and Sweden," and urged that a few frigates would be a cogent 
argument against Danish obstinacy. 1 These views were, of course, 
very favorable to Charles Gustavus, and we need not be surprised to 
find that Jephson received in return an accurate knowledge, at least 
in outline, of the king's plans with regard to Denmark. 

On November 2 Jephson sent the Council "the relation of an ac- 
tion perhaps as extraordinary as may fall out in an age"; 2 but the 
letter is unfortunately lost. In his next dispatch he refers to it as 
containing his "sense of the whole state of affairs in these parts, upon 
the taking of Fredericksode [Fredericia]," and continues: "I know 
nothing in my poor opinion were more worthy his Highness, than (at 
this time when he hath ministers with all the most considerable Protest- 
ant princes ancV states) to propose a general meeting for the advancement 
of the common interest of religion, and the civil interest, and reconcil- 
ing of differences ; for (until both religion and the civil interest of every 
state be something secured) I fear particular treaties will not do the 
work." 3 At last in an important letter of the 24th of November, he 
gives some clue to the contents of his letter of November 2. After 
urging again "a general treaty betwixt all the Protestants," he pro- 
ceeds, "Sir, my meaning by joining with Sweden was, that if by the 
king of Denmark's obstinacy the power of the Baltic Sea shall be 
devolved to other hands, you would so oblige the king of Sweden by 
assisting him, that he might put a part of it in your hand. The places 
I mentioned in my letter of the 2d instant, and my opinion of them, 
according to my best intelligence, which I suppose you had not then 
received, they were Gottenburg and Fredericksode. I assure myself 
you were not before ignorant of the conveniences and inconveniences 
belonging to them, which I will not presume to judge of." 4 "I shall 

1 See Jephson's dispatches in Thurloe Papers. 
'Thurloe Papers, vi., 597. 

3 Ibid., (i04. He was again urging Charles Gustavus' policy, it will be noticed. 
* Ibid., 629. 
5 



66 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

not sail punctually," he says in this same letter, "to observe his High- 
ness' command to the king of Sweden concerning the business of 
Fredericksodde. " 

The thread of evidence offered by this passage is slight, yet taken 
in connection with accompanying circumstances, it seems clear, that in 
answer to the Protector's constant demand for "security" and a mili- 
tary base before undertaking a distant campaign, Charles Gustavus 
had suggested that Fredericia and Gothenburg might serve this pur- 
pose. The mention of Fredericia had, of course, reference to its re- 
cent capture and may possibly have been intended to whet Cromwell's 
appetite for the whole of Jutland. I find it difficult to believe, how- 
ever, that the king was willing to surrender so important a port as 
Gothenburg, the only Swedish port without the Sound, in anything 
like permanent possession, especially after the efforts which had just 
been made to increase its importance. 1 It would seem more probable 
that it was proposed as temporary headquarters for the English fleet, 
for which it was admirably suited, and had little value to the Swedes 
at the time from the ease with which it could be blockaded by the 
Danes. 

That proposals of this kind were made is not of itself improbable. 
Pufendorff gives an account 2 of still more remarkable proposals, 
which resemble those of Friesendorff 's instructions. If Cromwell 
would undertake to support Sweden without reserve and strike Den- 
mark to the ground, Charles Gustavus would agree to its partition in 
the following terms : Norway, Schonen, Seeland, and Funen should 
be incorporated with Sweden, while Cromwell should have the whole 
of Jutland and Bremen ; the passage of the Sound would be free to 
all nations, and the prospect was offered of an attack on Austria. Or, 
if Cromwell preferred, Sweden would take only Norway and Schonen, 
and allow Cromwell Bremen, while the crown of Denmark would be 
given to another. The plan of giving Jutland to the Duke of Hol- 
stein-Gottorp, Cromwell taking Oldenburg and Delmenhorst, was also 
mentioned. But Cromwell's answer must be given soon and his ac- 
ceptance unreserved, else so important a position as Bremen could not 
be surrendered. I have not found the slightest reference to these pro- 

1 Fries, Erik Oxenstierna, p. 132. 

2 Lib. iv., §86, undated, but they must have come at about this time. 



CROMWELL AND CHAELES GUSTAVUS. 67 

posals among English records, and so cannot tell what impression 
they made. They had, however, the very serious drawback of giving 
Sweden absolute control of the supplies for ship-building, which was 
considered a power too great to be intrusted to one hand. This was 
considered a matter of vital importance at the time and is often men- 
tioned in the diplomatic correspondence relating to the North. 

It would be to no purpose to trace further the details of the ensuing 
negotiations. They present nothing new. One meets the same diffi- 
culties, the same arguments, and delays for much the same reasons. 1 
The only episode worth mentioning is Cromwell's speech to both 
Houses of Parliament on January 25, 2 which throws a flood of light 
on the Protector's feelings at this time. " I do believe, he that looks 
well about him, and considereth the estate of the Protestant affairs all 
Christendom over ; he must needs say and acknowledge that the grand 
design now on foot, in comparison with which all other designs are 
but low things, is, Whether the Christian world shall be all popery? 
* * * I have, thank God, considered, and I would beg of you to 
consider a little with me : What that resistance is that is likely to be 
made to this mighty current, which seems to be coming from all parts 
on all Protestants ? Who is there that holdeth up his head to oppose 
this danger? A poor prince; — indeed poor; but a man in his person 
as gallant, and truly I think I may say as good, as these last ages have 
brought forth ; a man that hath advanced his all against the popish in- 
terest in Poland and made his aquisition still good ' there ' for the 
Protestant religion. He is now reduced into a corner; and that which 
addeth to the grief of all, — more than all that hath been spoken of 
before (I wish it may not be truly said !) — is, That men of our relig- 
ion forget this, and seek his ruin. * * * It is a design against 
our very being ; this artifice, and this complex design, against the 
Protestant interest, — wherein so many Protestants are not so right as 
were to be wished ! If they can shut us out of the Baltic Sea, and 
make themselves master of that, where is your trade? Where are 
your materials to preserve your shipping? Where will you be able 
to challenge any right by sea, or justify yourself against a foreign in- 
vasion in your own soil? Think upon it; this is in design!" 

1 PufendorfTs account is very full here. Lib., iv., \ 86. Lib., v., §§ 73, 74, and 75. I have 
nothing of importance to add to it. 
- Reported in Burton's Diary, ii., 351. Also Carlyle, Speech XVII. 



68 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

Surely it was no fault of intention that the Protector did not take 
a more active part in this business ! But with the imminent dangers 
on every hand, a bankrupt treasury, the army and civil service unpaid, 
Ireland unsettled, Scotland in great suffering, England impatient, and 
the two Houses disputing about titles and refusing to come to busi- 
ness, 1 what could the Protector do? His efforts to mediate had come 
to a standstill, yet he could not bring himself to adopt a different 
course. While he was hesitating and waiting for a favorable turn in 
the course of events, an unpropitious Providence paved the way for 
Swedish successes which rendered hopeless his plan of reconciling the 
two nations, even for the preservation of their faith. 

Treaty of Roeskilde. — It is of course impossible to give here any 
account of the negotiations which preceded and followed the treaty of 
Roeskilde, or of the exceedingly complicated events attending Crom- 
well's attempt to mediate a new peace after the outbreak of the second 
war in August ; but it is of great interest to observe how Cromwell's 
attitude towards both nations was changed by these startling events, 
and how his general policy was affected by the altered state of politics 
in the North. 

There are no special instructions to Meadowe concerning the treaty 
of Eoeskilde, but, fortunately, both Thurloe and Meadowe have told 
us of the objects sought by the Protector with a candor and directness 
which leaves nothing to be desired. " The Protector," says Thurloe, 2 
"though he wished in general the prosperity of the Swede, his ally, 
hoping that at last his arms might be directed the right way, yet did not 
like that the Swede should conquer the Dane, and possess all those coun- 
tries, and being thereby become powerful, engross the whole trade of the 
Baltic Sea, wherein England is so much concerned, and therefore he in- 
terposed in most serious terms with both the kings to make peace, which 
was accepted by both." "The English mediator," writes Meadowe, 
" had two parts to act in this scene; one w r as to moderate the -demands 
as far as he could in favor of the sufferer, without disobliging the 
Swede by a too notorious partiality. The other was to watch lest 
anything be stipulated betwixt the two kings prejudicial to the inter- 
ests of England. It was moved that the whole kingdom of Norway 

1 Indervvick, Studies in the Great Rebellion, 27. 

2 Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time. 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 69 

should be rent off from Denmark and united to Sweden, with which 
it lay contiguous: This entrenched upon England as giving the 
Swede the sole and entire possession of the chief materials, as masts, 
deals, pitch, tar, copper, iron, etc., needful for the apparel and equip- 
age of our ships, too great a treasure to be entrusted in one hand. 
The mediator, in avoidance of this was the first who insinuated the 
proposal of rending Sconen and Blecking to the Swede, which would 
cut off that unnecessary charge both crowns sustained in garrisoning 
a frontier each against other, by enlarging the Swedish dominions to 
the bank of the Sound, the ancient and natural boundary of Sweden. 
This though uneasy to the Dane because of the vicinity of those 
provinces to Copenhagen the metropolis, yet was safe for England, 
because by this means the Swede is become master of one bank of 
the Sound as the Dane is of the other, though the accustomed duty of 
passage (the best flower in the Danish garland) was reserved by the 
treaty wholly to the Dane. Thus the power over that narrow entry 
into the Baltic being balanced betwixt two emulous crowns, will be 
an effectual preventive of any new exactions or usurpation in the 
Sound." ! 

Thus the efforts of the English mediator were directed chiefly, almost 
exclusively, to the preservation of English commercial interests. This 
need occasion no surprise, since the Protector had no other rule to guide 
him in case of a conflict between these two Protestant powers. While, 
of course, the interests of religion required that Protestant nations 
should not turn their arms against each other, yet it was the interests 
of trade, not of religion, which was the Protector's incentive for pre- 
serving the status quo in the Baltic, — always, as we have seen, a vital 
point of his policy. If he could not share in the partition of Den- 
mark for fear of giving too much power to Sweden in the Baltic, much 
less could he allow Denmark to be entirely swallowed up by Sweden 
without a share in the booty. Yet he had no objection to Denmark's 
being partially absorbed by Sweden in so far as English interests 
would be benefited by it. The English were, indeed, far from disin- 

1 Narrative, p. 58. See, also, View of the Suedish and Other Affairs, p. 169, seq. " For 'tis evident 
that the dividing the banks of the Sound betwixt the two emulous crowns, as it was done by 
the Roschild treaty, is greater to the security and benefit of England, etc." " I am making all 
the haste I can to the king of Swede, as conceiving his Highness not a little concerned in 
these affairs, especially in the interest of the Sound, and the traffic of the Baltic Sea." Jephson 
to Henry Cromwell, February 22, 1658. Landsdowne MSS. 822, fol. 143. 



70 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

terested mediators. "The Swedish propositions, I confess, are very 
high," wrote Meadowe, 1 "but their advantages are likewise very great." 

Yet, in view of the circumstances, the conditions of the treaty, while 
severe, were favorable to Denmark, which was due in no small meas- 
ure to the offices of the mediators, particularly, it would appear, of 
Meadowe. Frederick III. sent a letter to Cromwell thanking him for 
his good offices and commending Meadowe, who also received the ex- 
traordinary honor of the Order of the Elephant, the highest order in 
Denmark, together with the offer of a pension, which lie tells us he 
refused. There were many scandalous reports concerning Meadowe 
circulated at that time by the Swedes and others, which may or may 
not have been true, 2 but they have, at least, the significance of showing 
how bitter was the resentment felt against him. 

After the Treaty of Roeskilde. — The relations between England and 
Sweden were not altered by the treaty of Roeskilde so much as one 
might have expected. The Swedes seemed not to cherish their resent- 
ment and the negotiations in London proceeded much as before. 3 I 
shall not trouble the reader with an account of them, for I have noth- 
ing to add to what Pufendorff tells us. 4 They illustrate how Crom- 
well's foreign efforts were hampered by internal difficulties, but have 
little farther significance. The Swedes urged to the last the payment 
of the £30,000 which Cromwell had promised in the preceding No- 
vember, but Parliament had been dissolved without obtaining a grant, 
and though Cromwell repeated his promise, he was never in a position 
to fulfil it. In short, Cromwell was laboring under such insuperable 
difficulties that no definite action could be reasonably expected of him. 
The various proposals which were made, none of which had anything 
novel about them, are therefore of little interest. 

One notices distinctly, however, this difference in Cromwell's treat- 
ment of Sweden, that he is more ready to give way to the demands of 

1 Meadowe to Thurloe. Thurloe Papers, vi., 802. 

2 It is difficult to get at the truth of these stories, which are to be found at sufficient length in 
Pufendorff. We should not, I think, lend them too ready credence, since they rest on the 
authority of Meadowe's political enemies. Pufendorff tells us, for example, that certain Dan- 
ish noblemen objected to one of Meadowe's station being made a member of the Order of the 
Elephant, and that Meadowe resigned the Order for a sum of money. But on May 31 (Meadowe 
to Thurloe, Eng. Hist. Rev., vii., 732) he was still in possession of the Order. However, he seems 
at best to have escaped with some loss of dignity, and felt called upon to explain in various 
letters to Thurloe. 

3 See note, page G3. 
*Puf., V.,§fj 76-83. 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 71 

Charles Gustavus than before. He has lost his control of affairs in 
the North, which is nowhere shown more clearly than in this, that 
he is now prepared to yield to Sweden the possession of Prussia. 
Meadowe's instructions of April 9, 1658, 1 in view of the expected ne- 
gotiations between Charles Gustavus and the other powers at Braunsberg 
for the purpose of the further pacification of the North, reads : " * * 
as to his retaining of Prussia, you are very well to understand the 
mind of the king of Sweden therein, and in case you find him fixed 
thereupon, you shall then endeavour in the treaty, yet with that circum- 
spection and prudence that becomes a mediator, that Prussia may be 
quitted to him by the king of Poland and to that purpose endeavour 
by all befitting wariness to incline the ministers of the States General 
thereunto, who are most likely to oppose it upon the interest of trade, 
to satisfy whom you may procure such assurance from the king of 
Sweden in that of trade in reference to his and that state as may re- 
move that difficulty. * ' * * And as the matter of commerce, 
you are not to be wanting there to inform yourself therein and to pro- 
vide for the same, and the interest of this state therein, so far as you 
shall have opportunity. " 

One might infer from this and other references that interests of 
trade were dominant in the Protector's mind, and that the matter of 
the great Protestant alliance had been driven entirely into the back- 
ground. This is certainly true to a certain extent and lay in the gen- 
eral state of northern politics. " That war, whilst it lasted, discom- 
posed affairs so much, as they could never be composed again," said 
Thurloe. 2 Yet a truer statement of the case would be this, that the 
real motive of Cromwell's policy was still antagonism to the house of 
Austria, but there had arisen a new and more important issue in the 
trade of the Baltic. Instead of the Piedmont massacres and mere 
vague alarms, they had now a definite and tangible bone of conten- 
tion. " It being the design of the Imperial House to get these coun- 
tries and to ? you the Baltic Sea under pretence of giving aid to 

the king of Denmark." 3 " The Protector very much apprehended 

i S. P., Sweden, ix. They are dated April 9, 1656, but though this is an original dating, the 
context shows it to be an error. It should be 1658. Among other things the treaty of Roes- 
kilde is referred to. They are printed in Thurloe Papers, vii., 63, where the correct date is 
given. 

2 Burton's Diary, iii., 378. 

3 Thurloe to Meadowe, November 27, 1657. Eng. Hist. Rev., vii., 724. 



72 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

the issue of this conjunction; he thought it equally dangerous for 
England that the Swede should be ruined and the Dane preserved by 
such saviours, who after they had broken the king of Sweden would 
also make a prey of the Dane himself, the emperor in his assistance he 
gave against the Swede, revived the old design of the Austrian [eagle] 
stretching her wings towards the eastern sea, and planting herself 
upon the Baltic." 1 

When the war between Sweden and Denmark was begun again in 
August by Charles Gustavus, as usual without consulting the Pro- 
tector, 2 the latter renewed his efforts to restore the peace. That his 
policy had not undergone any material change by the treaty of Roes- 
kilde is shown by the similarity between these two attempts at media- 
tion. "The Protector in this whole business laid this for a founda- 
tion, that it was not for the interest of this nation that either the Swede 
or Dane should be ruined in this war, and that it was ever safest for 
England that the Sound and those countries should remain in the hands 
of the Dane, and therefore as he had interposed in the first war to 
preserve the Dane, so he resolved by the same measures to proceed and 
so to manage these affairs that this might receive no alteration in those 
parts." 3 This had been the starting point of the first mediation. 
Again, as before, the mediation was offered between Sweden and Den- 
mark alone, and without including other powers, which would compli- 
cate and delay matters. "That which the Protector pitched upon in 
this great occasion was to endeavour a present peace between the 
Dane and the Swede, upon the late treaty of Roskild, made by his 
own mediation without taking in the differences between Poland and 
Sweden, or the Swede and Brandenburg, or comprehending the pre- 
tences of the Dutch and the Emperour, which having many intrica- 
cies in them would require time. This the Protector did to obviate 
the designs of the Dutch, as also to keep open the door for making use 
of the arms of the Swede another way. This was liked by none of 
the contending parties, the Swede though thus beset, yet having got 
into his possession the Sound and all Denmark but the town of Co- 
penhagen, and believing that France and England would not suffer 
him to flinck was unwilling to be brought back again to the treaty of 

JThurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time. Also Cromwell's speech quoted on page 67. 
2 The Protector never learned the exact causes of this war. 
3 Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwel.'s Time. 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GTJSTAVUS. 73 

Roskild. The Dane was more adverse than he, not doubting but by 
the aid of his confederates to recover all again, and the confederates 
bpposed it or any treaty without comprehending all their interests, and 
the Dutch most of all infested here, the meaning whereof was that 
they had all agreed totally to ruin the Swede, and the Dutch doubted 
not of his part in the advantage." 1 

These last efforts to restore the peace in the North could not, from 
the difficulties with which Cromwell was surrounded and his own fail- 
ing health, be other than lame and without result. They are interest- 
ing, not from their results, but as showing what Cromwell tried to do. 

The New Protector; Oronenburg. — It would hardly be justifiable to 
close this narrative without some notice of the affairs after Cromwell's 
death, since Thurloe remained secretary of state, and in only one re- 
gard did the administration of the foreign office suffer a material change. 
Richard announced that his father's policy in the North would be 
continued ; 2 yet in one point, unconsciously, perhaps, he departed from 
it. The outbreak of the war between Sweden and Denmark had so 
confused northern affairs that the Protector's plan for a great Protestant 
alliance had been driven entirely into the background. It had become, 
in fact, impracticable, and no longer coincided with the actual trend of 
European politics. Yet he clung to it with the greatest persistence, 
and as long as he lived the religious controversy was still a factor in 
European politics which could not be ignored. After his death, how- 
ever, it ceases to become so. The habit of referring to the "Protestant 
interest " continued for a time in England, as might be expected, yet 
' not only do these phrases occur less frequently, but one feels instinct- 
ively that they were less sincere. The proof that they were so lies in 
the fact that the controlling motive in English foreign politics was no 
longer hostility to the Catholic house of Hapsburg, but the commercial 
rivalry of their Protestant kinsmen, the Dutch. It is hardly an 

1 Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's time. The relations with the Netherlands are a kind 
of barometer which indicate the ebbs and flows of motives of trade in English foreign politics. 
In the increased hostility here shown, we have an indication that commercial interests were 
of increasing importance, and, as we know, became, rfter the Protector's death, the sole spring 
of English action in the North. We must bear in mind, in using Thurloe's account, that it 
was written in 1660, when the dominant feature of English foreign policy was the rivalry of the 
Dutch. His whole account is colored by it. This was by no means so important a feature of 
the Protector's policy as one would gather from his paper, and I have not always felt justified 
in accepting his statements. But with this qualification, it is of course a source of the highest 
value. 

2 Pufendorff, v., g 115. 



74 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

exaggeration to say that the death of Cromwell marks an epoch in 
European history, the close of the period of religious wars. 

When Charles Gustavus landed in Seeland he sent a special envoy, ' 
John Leyenbergen, to England with an explanation of the causes of the 
war, and a request for at least twenty ships, in return for which he was 
ready to grant, in addition to certain staple rights, that English ships 
enjoy equal privileges in Sweden with Swedish unarmed ships, and 
that certain quantities of shipping materials be furnished England at a 
lower price. 1 But Cromwell died before receiving this message. I 
have found two references to another concession not mentioned by Pufen- 
dorff which Charles Gustavus is said to have proposed, presumably in 
this connection. On February 23, 1659, Mr. Topham, a burgess for 
York, informed Parliament that he had been told by a merchant who 
had carried dispatches between the English government and Charles 
Gustavus, that Charles Gustavus had made offer of Elsinore Castle as 
security for the loan of twenty English frigates. 2 The subject is men- 
tioned again in a tract by Slingsby Bethel, entitled "The World's Mis- 
take in Oliver Cromwell," which was printed anonymously in 1668. 3 
Bethel tells us, referring to it as a sufficiently well known matter, that 
Cromwell and Charles Gustavus had agreed to divide the control of 
the Baltic between them, and that Cromwell's share was to be Elsinore 
Castle and Cronenburg, "the Gibraltar of the North," together with 
the tolls of the Sound. Bethel shows himself throughout this tract so 
well informed 4 that I was at first inclined to accept his statement, but 
after discovering the passage in Burton it seems to me not improbable 
that this is the source of Bethel's information. If this is true, and 
Bethel is merely repeating a general rumor which originated with 

iPufendorff, v., 114. 

2 " Two masters of Hull were at the Baltic, in October last, being laden with corn. One of 
them carried a packet from the king of Sweden, and brought one back again. He affirmed 
that the king offered, if his Highness of England would but lend him twenty frigates, he would 
deposit in our hands Elsinore Castle for his security, and I believe we might have our own 
terms. Nothing under Heaven concerns the English so much as that channel. Let us plant 
our ships in time there, and we may have advantage enough of the Hollander." Burton's 
Diary, iii., 436. 

3 It is printed in Harleian Miscellany, i., 287, and in State Tracts, part i., 376. I have printed 
the passage under consideration as Appendix (B) to this work. 

4 Compare, for example, his statements with regard to Ostend, Newport, and Dunkirk with 
those of Thurloe in Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time. I have found the statement of Crom- 
well's willingness finally to yield Prussia to Charles Gustavus only in the original instruc- 
tions, in Pufendorff and in this tract. Bethel stood in well with the Republicans and was in a 
position to receive much information. I have been able to verify several statements which I 
found first in this pamphlet. 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 75 

Topham's statement to Parliament, which in turn rested upon the 
statement of a merchant carrying secret dispatches and not, so far as 
we can see, in a position to know their contents, then the whole story- 
rests upon a very slender footing. These suspicions must be strength- 
ened by the fact that when Meadowe, in the spring of 1659, hinted at 
the English possession of Cronenburg and the island Hewen, Charles 
Gustavus seems not to have entertained the proposal for a moment. 1 
If he himself had made the same proposal a few months before, one is 
at a loss to account for so sudden a change in his attitude, since there 
appears to be no diplomatic or military event which would explain it. 
Yet Charles Gustavus did sometimes change his plans for no very 
great reason, and he may have done so in this case. It is impossible 
to decide the matter definitely without fuller information. In the 
meantime, those interested in the subject may be glad to have their 
attention called to these passages. 

The Partition of Denmark Again. — The ill success of Charles Gus- 
tavus' second invasion of Denmark and the desperate state of his for- 
tunes in consequence of it, made him more willing than he had ever 
been before to concede real advantages to England if English support 
could be obtained by it. Even before Cromwell's death, Pufendorft 
tells us of a proposal that Cromwell occupy Emden or Meppen in 
order to hold the Dutch in check and prevent the Austrians from rais- 
ing recruits in Westphalia. As soon as Charles Gustavus heard of 
Cromwell's death, he sent another ambassador, Gustavus Duval, to 
Richard with a request for aid against the Dutch similar to the one 
sent through Leyenbergen, but though Richard declared his readiness 
to enter into an oifensive alliance with Sweden against Austria and a 
defensive alliance against the rest of the world, yet he gave various 
excuses for not furnishing the twenty ships asked for. In October 
Friesendorff received secret orders to offer Bremen and Verden to 
Richard if he would assist in the Swedish conquest of Denmark and 
Norway, but with the proviso that the provinces should not be delivered 
into English possession until after the surrender of Copenhagen. Both 
ambassadors were authorized to offer freedom from tolls in the Sound 

i Pufendorft", vi., g 21. Downing wrote Thurloe from the Hague that the Dutch were trying 
to secure the same prize from the Danes. Downing to Thurloe, Thurloe Papers, vii., 427, 469, 
506, and 515. Thurloe evidently believed this. "* * * and as now, in fact, they [the Dutch] 
had in mortgage a part of the king of Denmark's dominions, they were also to have Cronenburg 
Castle into their hands as security for the money expended in the war." Foreign Affairs in 
Cromwell's Time. 



76 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

and in Iceland in return for money and ships. 1 These offers were not 
without attraction for the English court. In case their policy of 
mediation proved fruitless, they were willing to assist the king, but 
only defensively, and on condition of some advantage for their costs. 
Meadowe mentioned Stade and Landscroue as suitable for this purpose, 2 
and during the summer Richard had proposed an alliance on the basis 
of freedom from tolls in the Sound for English commerce, equal rights 
with Swedes in all Swedish ports and the closing of the Sound to Eng- 
land's enemies. 3 To this Charles Gustavus made a counter-proposal, 
that England take possession of Gluckstadt, Krempen, and Wilsteren, 
and as security for loans, Iceland, with the jurisdiction over Berghen, 
the claims of Norway to the Orkney Islands, and in addition Stade 
and Swingen, except the sovereignty over this city. Meadowe sug- 
gested that Cronenburg and the island Hewen would be more accept- 
able, which embarrassed the king greatly, since the cession of these 
places could not be thought of. He was driven, therefore, to recur to 
his old plan of dividing Denmark. Friesendorff was empowered to 
offer Bremen and Verden and the assistance of Sweden in obtaining 
Iceland and Greenland, provided Richard would aid in the conquest 
of Norway. If Richard were willing to go further and partition Den- 
mark, England would receive in addition to the above all of Jutland 
except the dominions of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, together with 
freedom from tolls in the Sound. Norway, Seeland, Funen and the 
other islands would go to Sweden. But the abdication of Richard 
put an end to these schemes. 4 

It would be an injustice to Richard, however, to emphasize these ad- 
venturous plans unduly. They occupied at best but a secondary place 

i Pufendorff, v., §115. 

-'Ibid., 1 118. "Therefore in case of an obstinate repugnancy to the peace on the Danish 
part upon the terms aforesaid, to assist the Swede in a defensive way under certain cautions 
and restrictions. In which the case of assistance, for in war many things may be supposed 
and provided against which never come to pass, the Swede was to give real gages and 
pledges for the garantie of his faith. To which end the English mediator had often and closely 
remonstrated to him that 'twas not reasonable to put a sword into another's hand without a 
previous assurance of its not being made use of against one's self. And used it also as an argu- 
ment to dispose the otherwise unwilling Swede to a peace with the Dane (for a war with Den- 
mark was of all wars the most commodious for him) because he was not to expect an assist- 
ance from England which should cost him nothing. And to forecast the temper of affairs, 
proceeded so far as to nominate Stade upon the Elbe, and Landscroon in the Sound, to be put 
in case of such assistance into English hands ; which taking vent afterwards, gave occasion to 
that frivolous report how that England and Sweden had agreed together to share Denmark 
betwixt them." Meadowe's Narrative, p. 119. 

3 Putendorff, vi., § 20, with the marginal date May 7. Carlson, iv., 334. 

4 Ibid., ? 21. Carlson, iv., 334. Soon after Charles Gustavus tried the effect of similar pro- 



CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 77 

in his thoughts, and were only an alternative in case his plan of mediat- 
ing a peace should fail. It was to give emphasis to this attempt at 
mediation that a fleet had been sent to the Sound in the autumn of 
1659 under Goodson, but it was forced to return without accomplishing 
anything, owing to the lateness of the season. In the following spring 
another fleet was sent out under Admiral Montague, who appeared 
before Copenhagen in April, not for the purpose, as both the Swedes 
and Danes at first supposed, of unconditionally supporting the Swedish 
cause, but to force them to accept peace on the basis of the treaty of 
Roeskilde, and to lend aid to Charles Gustavus only in so far as it might 
appear necessary from the attempts of the Dutch or of the confeder- 
ates of the Danes to defeat this object. AVhen one considers the great 
difficulties under which Richard labored and his constant struggles 
with Parliament, his effective interference in the Baltic really does 
him great credit. A war with Holland over the matter was at first 
by no means impossible, and the presence of the English fleet in the 
Baltic not only prevented a more active interference by the Dutch in 
behalf of the Danes, but persuaded them that independent action in 
the Baltic was impracticable. The first Concert of the Hague was 
therefore by no means a concession to the Dutch, but was quite in 
accordance with the English policy of armed mediation, and was 
moreover, although the Swedish king bitterly, resented this attempted 
dictation, in reality an act of friendship towards Sweden. The second 
and third Concerts of the Hague, however, concluded by the Parlia- 
ment after Richard's abdication, show clearly how England's foreign 
influence Avas paralyzed by internal difficulties. It would take us 
too far from our subject to discuss the negotiations leading up to the 
treaty of Oliva, which form, moreover, a chapter in Dutch rather than 
in English history, since the Parliament had lost its influence over the 
course of affairs, and was compelled to resign the conduct of the me- 
diation into the hands of its rivals. " The truth is they made no 
great scruple, at least for that one time, to come under the stern of 
their neighbouring Commonwealth, thereby to have better leisure to 
recollect and refit the scattered planks and pieces of their own broken 
Republic." l 

posals in Holland. Erdmannsdorffer, Deutsche Geschichte, i., 337. Carlson, iv., 342. Charles 
Gustavus' plan was to unite Norway with Sweden, together with Cronenburg, in order to con- 
trol the Sound. 
1 Meadowe's Narrative, p. 122. 



APPENDIX. 



Extract from Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time, as Given 
by Thurloe, 1660. 

(Stowe MSS., clxxxv., fol. 187.) 

The State of the Northern Affairs . — In the year [1655] the war 
broke out between Sweden and Poland, which Sweden undertook 
without any counsel of the Protector but after he was engaged therein 
he sent an extraordinary ambassador to desire aid from the Protector 
for carrying on that war as directed by him for the advantage of the 
Protestant interest. 

In the debate of that affair it came to a proposition and an agree- 
ment, that the Swede should carry his arms against the emperor and 
house of Austria, and that upon the foundation thereof, and the war 
which England and France had with Spain (the other branch of the 
house of Austria in the west) a league offensive and defensive should 
be made between England, France, and Sweden, whereunto should be 
invited the states of Holland, king of Denmark, and the elector of 
Brandenburg and other states and a concept of articles was drawn 
and debated between the commissioners of the Protector and the 
ambassador of Sweden, and communicated to the Dutch and French 
ambassadors. 

The Dutch declared their unwillingness, and apprehended danger 
to themselves from the success of the Swede in Poland, and took reso- 
lutions underhand to give him troubles, and by great promises of 
assistance to the king of Denmark, and by rewards to his councilors, 
engaged that king contrary to his own interests, to invade the king of 
Sweden in his Duchy of Bremen. 

This drew the king of Sweden out of Poland and set the war 
wholly on a new foot, and most of the princes of states in Europe 
found themselves concerned to intermeddle in it. 

(79) 



80 APPENDIX. 

The principal combatants were the king of Sweden, Poland, and 
Denmark, the duke of Brandenburg who at first joined with Sweden, 
fell off to Poland, the emperor also declared with him. 

The Dutch underhand irritate the aforesaid princes against the 
Swede, though openly they were in treaty with him for adjusting their 
own interests. 

The Swede had nevertheless that success against the Dane, that they 
had almost made a conquest of all Denmark and was bringing the 
Sound under his power. 

The Protector though he wished in general the prosperity of the 
Swede, his ally, hoping that at last his arms might be directed the 
right way, yet did not like that the Swede should conquer the Dane, 
and possess all those countries, and being thereby become power- 
ful, engross the whole trade of the Baltic Sea, wherein England is so 
much concerned, and therefore he interposed in most serious terms 
with both the kings to make peace which was accepted by both, and 
peace ensued, thereupon, called the peace or treaty of Roskild. But the 
war being renewed again the next autumn the matter became more 
entangled. The emperor, duke of Brandenburg, kings of Poland and 
Denmark entered into a league of offensive and defensive [ 
against the Swede, the Dutch also declare the same way, and prepare 
a fleet and laud forces for the assistance of the Dane. 

The Protector very much apprehended the issue of this conjunction, 
he thought it equally dangerous for England that the Swede should be 
ruined and the Dane preserved by such saviours, who after they had 
broken the king of Sweden, would also make a prey of the Dane 
himself, the emperor in his assistance he gave against the Swede, re- 
vived the old design of the Austrian [eagle] stretching her wings 
towards the eastern sea, and planting herself upon the Baltic. 

The Dutch aimed at the command of the Sound and under pre- 
tence that the Dane was too weak to keep it against his neighbours, 
would have kept it for him, and had already swallowed up [Drunt- 
heim] a place of great importance, mortgaged to them by the king of 
Denmark for money to support him in his wars, and was agreed to be 
delivered into his hands, so that the price of the king of Denmark's 
deliverance, was like to be the resigning himself up into the hands of 
the Dutch as his guardians. 



APPENDIX. 81 

That which the Protector pitched upon in this great occasion was 
to endeavour a present peace between the Dane and the Swede, upon 
the late treaty of Roskild, made by his own mediation without taking 
in the differences between Poland and Sweden, or the Swede and Bran- 
denburg, or comprehending the pretences of the Dutch and the em- 
perour, which having many intricacies in them would require time. 

This the Protector did to obviate the designs of the Dutch, as also 
to keep open the door for making use of the arms of the Swede in 
another way. 

This was liked by none of the contending parties, the Swede 
though thus beset, yet having got into his possession the Sound and 
all Denmark but the town of Copenhagen, and believing that France 
and England would not suffer him to flinck was unwilling to be brought 
back again to the treaty of Roskild. The Dane was more adverse 
than he, not doubting but by the aid of his confederates to recover all 
again and the confederates opposed it, or any treaty without compre- 
hending all their interests, and the Dutch most of all infested here, 
the meaning whereof was, that they had all agreed totally to ruin the 
Swede, and the Dutch doubted not of his part in the advantage. 

The Protector in this whole business laid this for a foundation, that 
it was not for the interest of this nation that either the Swede or Dane 
should be ruined in this war, and that [it] was ever safest for England, 
that the Sound and those countries should remain in the hands of 
the Dane, and therefore as he had interposed in the first war to pre- 
serve the Dane, so he resolved by the same measures to proceed, and 
so to manage these affairs that this might receive no alternation in those 
parts. 

And having communicated with France herein and finding that 
Court to have the same sentiments, they entered into a treaty for the 
mutual management thereof, wherein it was agreed that France and 
England should propound to the two kings of Sweden and Denmark 
the renewing the treaty of Roskild without comprehending any of the 
confederates. 

2dly. That they should declare themselves enemies to him that re- 
fuse it, and assist him that accept it. 

3dly. That both should send to the Dutch to induce them to join in 
this mediation. 



82 APPENDIX. 

4thly. If a war should happen to England by reason of any assist- 
ance to be given in this case that France should declare the enemies of 
England enemies of France, and make war against them, and 6 contra 
England to do the same for France. 

5thly. That the peace being made between the Dane and Swede, 
France and England shall interpose to reconcile the Swede to the 
king of Poland and duke of Brandenburg. 

The ambassadors of France and England at the Hague propounded 
the terms aforesaid to the Dutch, but they refused, and instead thereof, 
prepared a general fleet and land forces to assist the Dane. 

England finding words would not prevail, prepared also a good fleet, 
and sent word to the Dutch that his fleet was prepared for the Sound, 
whither it should sail the first opportunity, that upon the arrival of 
it there, France and England would offer the mediation to Sweden and 
Denmark to agree with them on the treaty of Roskild, and endeavour 
to compel the opposing party by force, at the same time the French 
and English at the Hague in the [name] of both their masters de- 
manded of the states their declaration that no aid or assistance should 
be sent to the contending parties to enflame that war, and that they 
should call back such as they have already sent. 

This being done in vigorous terms brought the Dutch to a temper 
and persuaded them to agree to join in the mediation on the aforesaid 
terms, and a treaty was thereupon entered into between all the three 
states for managing this affair and the fleets of both states to sail 
thither as common friends to both kings, to bring them to a peace in 
the manner before expressed. 

At the same time a treaty was made between England and Sweden, 
that in case the king of Denmark was refractory and refused the peace, 
that then England would assist Sweden against them, and in recom- 
pense of the charges and hazards of the war, a sum of money was to 
be paid England and freedom to the English forever from paying toll 
in their passages to and from the Baltic Sea in case of success against 
the Dane, for the performance whereof security was to be given to 
England. 

In pursuance of this treaty the English fleet sailed to the Sound and 
soon after arrived the Dutch, and then the mediation was offered to 
both the kings in the name of the three states, and a certain day pre- 



APPENDIX. 



83 



fixed whether they would accept the peace upon the terms propounded, 
both made great difficulty therein, and the Dutch who openly joined 
with the French and English ambassadors did yet underhand dissuade 
the Dane from accepting, and spun out the treaty into a length, until 
the English fleet returned home from the necessity of their own 
affairs, leaving the treaty unfinished, the management whereof fell into 
the hands of the Rump, then entered of others who took different 
measures of this affair. 

The Dutch had discovered in this and other affairs a fixed design 
to monopolize all trade into their own hands, that in the Mediterra- 
nean they hoped to obtain by occasion of that war between England 
and Spain, and having the carriage of all Spanish goods, and to man- 
age their trade to and from the Indies in their ships, they endeavoured 
to put such articles upon England under the notion of a free ship 
free goods in the marine treaty, as might free their ships from all 
search and molestation, whereby enemy's goods might have been car- 
ried with all safety, desiring thereby to draw all traffic into their own 
ships, and so infinitely increase their own shipping and navigation. 

By occasion of the wars in the eastern parts they endeavoured to 
engross the trade of the Baltic Sea, for having engaged the Dane to 
make war with the Swede, under pretence of giving him assistance, 
they designed to draw him into an absolute dependence upon them, and 
be means hereof to have the same power upon the Sound as in their 
own hands, a thing formerly attempted by them by taking the farm of 
that passage raising themselves and raising other nations at their 
pleasure, and as now in fact they had in mortgage a part of the king 
of Denmark's dominions, they were also to have Cronenburg Castle 
into their hands as a security for the money expended in the war. 

As to the trade in the East Indies where they were superior at sea, 
they had in their [own] intentions swallowed all ; their method in 
those parts was this, if the English or any other nation had driven a 
good trade with any of those people, their manner was presently to 
proclaim war with that people, and lay a ship or two at sea before the 
ports where the trade was, which they called a blocking up, and by 
colour thereof seized on all ships and goods going in or out of those 
parts, as trading in an enemy's country, and on this pretence seized on 
three' English [ships] in the East Indies, richly laden, and converted 



84 APPENDIX. 

them to their own use, the news hereof came about the same time 
when these negotiations were in the Sound, and satisfaction being asked 
of them, they at first justified the fact, but being told in plain terms 
that if the true value of the goods and ships according as they had 
been worth in case they had arrived safe, in Europe, were not paid at 
the day prefixed, that England would take their own satisfaction by 
force, they complied and paid to the merchants concerned the full value 
in ready money. 

There were no greater considerations in England in reference to for- 
eign interests, than how to obviate the growing greatness of the Dutch. 
This state of affairs in the Sound though raised by themselves seemed 
to give an occasion of doing something in it. The Swede was incensed 
against them as the authors of ruining his designs in Poland and else- 
where, and would have proclaimed war against them, if England 
would have engaged with him therein. The king of Denmark grew 
weary of his assistance, and expressed great discontent towards them, 
seeing that in the end though he should be preserved from the Swede, 
he should be left in the power of the Dutch, and swallowed up with 
their pretenses. 

England was at that time in amity with both those kings, that of 
Sweden was not assured, but nothing of offence had happened with 
Denmark since the conclusion of the treaty 1654. But on the con- 
trary, that king took acceptably the mediation of England, on which 
the peace of Roskild ensued, and sent letters of thanks for the good 
offices towards that crown. 

That which seems to be England's true interest in this occasion, 
was to employ their utmost efforts to accommodate the differences be- 
tween these two crowns, the means whereof after the Dutch did mani- 
festly cross that in private which they had agreed to by treaty were 
these. 

That England and France should use their joint endeavours to bring 
the Swede to abate of his demands to the Dane, which he could not 
prosecute without offence to all his neighbours, and instead thereof to 
prosecute his first designs against the house of Austria, following 
therein the example of great Gustavus, and wherein France and Eng- 
land would give him great assistance both of money and forces. 

The Dane being thus delivered from this dangerous war [ 



APPENDIX. 85 

be induced to a conjunction with Sweden and to favour his designs the 
others, England and France becoming the sponsors of the peace and 
amity between them. 

To let the king of Denmark see the ill effects of his friendship with 
the Dutch, who had many times engaged him to the hazard of his 
crown, merely to serve their interests, thus they engaged him against 
England in 1622 and now against Sweden, and when he was thus en- 
gaged, they imposed on him unreasonable terms of assistance, at other 
times would assist against him as in 1654 when they helped the 
Swede against him, and obliged the Danes to yield up part of his do- 
minions to the Swede, which he holds at this day. 

And thereupon to offer him the friendship of England instead of 
the Dutch, as that which he might depend upon in any rencontres with 
his neighbours contrary to the peace to be agreed upon by any one side 
or the other, and thereby be freed from his dependence on the Dutch, 
who under pretence of friendship would oppress him. 

The elector of Brandenburg was to be invited into this league, and 
to draw him off from those alliances which were contrary thereunto. 

There was a particular treaty on foot with Sweden and Poland, that 
a good correspondence might be held with that kingdom, being the 
ancient ally with France and useful to England in respect of our trade 
to Danzig and the towns in the Regall Prussia. 

England, France, Sweden, Denmark, and Brandenburg being thus 
allied together upon their common interests, this was thought the best 
way that these affairs could be put into a reference to the interest of 
England in those, and the king of England being at that time upon 
solid terms of friendship with France, and having the advantage of 
ports on both sides the narrow seas, whence they could easily disturb 
their navigation through the channel, there was no doubt but the state 
of things would bring the Dutch either by fair means or force to live 
by their neighbours upon just and reasonable terms. 



86 APPENDIX. 

B. 
Extract from The World's Mistake in Oliver Cromwell. 

( Harleian Miscellany, i., 287. State Tracts, part i., 376. ) 

But this man, who, through ignorance, is so strangely cried up iu the 
world, was not guilty of this error in state only, but committed as great 
a solecism, in his designing the outing of the king of Denmark, and 
setting up the king of Sweden. For had the Swedes but got Copen- 
hagen (as in all probability, had Oliver lived, they would have done,) 
they had wanted nothing of consequence, but the cities of Lubeck and 
Danzig (which, by their then potency, they would easily have gained), 
of being masters of the whole Baltic Sea, on both sides, from the 
Sound or mouth down to the bottom of it ; by which, together with all 
Denmark, Norway, and the Danes' part of Holstein, which would con- 
sequently have been theirs (they then having, as they still have, the land 
of Bremen), there would have been nothing, but the small countries of 
Oldenberg and East Friesland, which would easily have fallen into 
their mouths, betwixt them and the United Netherlands, whereby 
Sweden would on the one side, to the north and north-east, have been 
as great, as France on the other, to the south and south-west; and they 
two, able to have divided the western empire betwixt them. 

And whereas it had in all ages been the policy of the northern states 
and potentates, to keep the dominion of the Baltic Sea divided among 
several petty princes and states, that no one might be sole master of it ; 
because, otherwise, most of the necessary commodities for shipping, 
coming from thence and Norway, any one lord of the whole might 
lay up the shipping of Europe, by the walls, in shutting only of his 
ports, and denying the commodities of his country to other states : 
Cromwell contrary to this wise maxim, endeavoured to put the whole 
Baltic Sea into the Swedes' hands, and undoubtedly had (though, I 
suppose, ignorantly) done it, if his death had not given them that suc- 
ceeded him, the Long Parliament, an opportunity of prudently pre- 
venting it. For, if he had understood the importance of the Baltic 
Sea to this nation, he could not have been so impolitic, as to have pro- 
jected so dangerous a design against his new Utopia, as giving the 
opening and shutting of it to any one prince. I am not ignorant, that 



APPENDIX. 



87 



this error is excused, by pretending that we were to have had Elsinore 
and Cronenburg Castle, (the first, the town, upon the narrow entrance 
of the Baltic, called the Sound, where all ships ride, and pay toll to 
the king of Denmark ; and the latter, the fortress, that defends both 
the town and ships,) by which we should have been masters of 
the Sound, and consequently of the Baltic : but they that know those 
countries, and how great a prince the Swede would have been, had he 
obtained all the rest, besides those two baubles ; must confess, we should 
have been at his devotion, in our holding of any thing in his countries. 
And further, if the dangerous consequence of setting up so great a 
prince had not been in the case, it had been against the interest of 
England, to have had an obligation upon us to maintain places so re- 
mote, against the enmity of many states and princes ; and that for these 
reasons : 

First, because the ordinary tolls of the Sound would not have de- 
frayed half the charge ; and, to have taken more than the ordinary tolls, 
we could not have done, without drawing a general quarrel upon 
us, from most of the princes and states of the northern parts of 
Europe. 

Secondly, etc. 



APPENDIX. 



C. 

Extract from Thurloe's Speech to Parliament, 
February 18, 1859. 

(Burton's Diary, iii., 380, seq.) 

This was the state of things in October last. His Highness, that 
now is, took these considerations: 

1. The continuance of a war in these parts would infinitely hinder 
our trade, and be of very great prejudice to this nation; many of our 
manufacturers being transported and vented thither, and many of our 
materials for shipping and navigation being carried from thence, 
hither. 

2. Considering what the issue of this war might be, that the Sound 
was likely to be put into the hands of those that would exclude the 
English, or put us in such a condition, as we should be as bad as ex- 
cluded ; the consequence of which would be the ruin of our shipping ; 
hemp, pitch, tar, cordage and mast, coming all from thence, and an 
obstruction there, would endanger our safety. 

We had experience of this in our war with the Dutch, when the 
Dane did prohibit our access thither, which put us to great distress, 
having none of those commodities, but what came from our enemies 
at double rates. 

3. His Highness considered that the emperor was likely to arrive 
at the design of the house of Austria, to command the Baltic, and the 
eastern seas, as the Spaniard already hath the command of the western 
seas. Thus, they would command all the trade of the world. Of 
this the Dutch were so sensible before, as they engaged the Swede to 
come to hinder the progress of the emperor, who is now fairer in 
hopes of it than ever he was in the world, they having greater posses- 
sions there than formerly, as two or three principal places in Holstein, 
by the delivery of Denmark, are already garrisoned by the emperor's 
forces. 

And I think the king of Denmark is in more danger from those 
that are allied with him than from his open enemies. 

4. He considered that when the emperor had done his business there, 
he and his confederates would next pour themselves into Flanders, and 



APPENDIX. 89 

from thence hither into this Commonwealth, where they intend to 
bring in another government, when they are ready for it. Such coun- 
sels, we know, are on foot, de facto, already. 

5. The great danger of overthrowing the Protestant interest, in 
general, which we have so much reason to preserve and promote. 

His Highness, considering these mischiefs, thought himself concerned 
to obviate them as far as he could. We are yet in friendship with all 
these princes, and have no enmity with the emperor; nor would his 
Highness have it otherwise. He therefore thought fit to interpose 
upon the account of amity. 

You should make it your first step to endeavour to reconcile those 
two fighting kings, thinking it to be our interest rather to preserve both, 
than to suffer either to be destroyed ; and that France and you would 
join to take off the Dutch and Brandenburg, if possible to reconcile the 
Pole and Sweden. 

To promote the success of this mediation, and bring all parties to a 
reconciliation, not excluding the house of Austria, too, his Highness 
thought fit and meet to send a fleet into those parts of twenty ships, to 
the intent to make a peace between the two kings, and of this he ac- 
quainted the States General. 



LEBENSLAUF. 



Der Verfasser, Guernsey Jones, Sohn des Predigers John A. Jones, 
und Ann geb. Davies, wurde am 4. August 1868 zu Foreston, Iowa, 
U. S. A., geboren. Seine Schulbildung erhielt er an den Volksschulen 
von Nebraska und California, und der Vallejo High School, Califor- 
nia. Im Jahre 1 886, bezog er die University of California in Berkeley, 
wo er naeh fiinf jahrigem Studium, den Grad eines Bachelor of Phi- 
losophy erhielt. Darauf besuchte er ein Jahr das Hastings College of 
Law, University of Calrfornia, San Francisco, kam im Jahre 1892 
nach Europa, wo er ein Semester an der Universitat Munchen, sechs 
Semester an der Universitat Heidelberg, und ein Term in der Biblio- 
theka Bodleiana, Oxford, zugebracht hat. 

Wahrend seines Aufenthalts dahier, hat er die Vorlesungen der 
folgenden Herren Professoren gehort: Erdmannsdorffer, Winkelmann, 
Heyck, Schick, Hoops und Fischer. 



